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Abstract
In this paper, I analyze the political legitimation of Russian President Vladimir Putin
through sexualized media avenues and the resulting challenges this poses to producing effective
women's policy. I examine the spectacle of Putin and the Duma in their handling of womens’
public health and economic issues, as well as female representation in spheres of power, by
continuing the Soviet tradition of symbolic submission. I seek to answer the question of how
these widely-produced images of the nastoyashiy muzhik, the real Russian man, influence
political consciousness in contemporary Russia; and determine whether there are inroads to
policy change outside of submission to the Kremlin.
Contemporary Russia has seen arduous regime change and economic upheaval––from the
traumatic reorganizing of society’s systems under Mikhail Gorbachev’s perestroika reforms, to
the instability of the Boris Yeltsin years, to Putin’s ascendance to power. Gender roles and the
fulfillment of their performance, specifically the machismo of the male head of state and
obligatory submission to his government, have maintained a continuous role in defining
contemporary power and stability.
I hypothesize that policy-enforced gender inequality runs parallel to the machismo image
of contemporary Russian power, and that this image has been woven through the political history
of Russia as it stands today, emboldening its performative political relationship to women. I
hypothesize that the concept of the “ideal,” submissive political woman is not gone and is central
to the treatment of women and women’s issues in Russia’s political culture today.
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The term “performativity” here is taken from the gender studies context, meaning the
active (be it unconscious or conscious) fulfillment of the performance of gender. This is best
illustrated by philosopher and gender theorist Judith Butler in her work Performative Acts and
Gender Constitution. B
 utler suggests that gender is a compliance with long-running norms and
patterns of behavior: “gender is an act which has been rehearsed, much as a script survives the
particular actors who make use of it,” and that ultimately “the performance is effected with the
strategic aim of maintaining gender within its binary frame. Understood in pedagogical terms,
1

the performance renders social laws explicit.” In ultra-patriarchal regimes, this is amplified by
the act of submission. This relates to the ‘slave soul’ mentality: Slavic studies scholar Daniel
Rancour-Laferriere writes that among the peasantry, “a daughter was expected to be obedient to
her father until he married her off, whereupon she was required to submit to the will of her
2

husband.” The use of the term “porn” in the title refers to the definition by legal scholar
Catherine MacKinnon and feminist writer Andrea Dworkin––entailing “graphic sexual
explicitness” and “the subordination of women”3 as well as a long list of sexual acts. In this
work, the subordination I refer to comes from the state.

Judith Butler. "Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology and Feminist Theory."
Theatre Journal, vol. 40, no. 4 (1988): 526
2
Daniel Rancour-Laferriere, The Slave Soul of Russia: Moral Masochism and the Cult of Suffering, ( New York:
NYU Press, 1995): 134
3
James Lindgren, “Defining Pornography,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review, vol. 141, no. 4 (1993): 1157
1
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Introduction
At the Moscow funeral ceremony of the famed Soviet dissident Lyudmila Alexeyeva,
President Vladimir Putin made an entrance with flowers, laid them by her casket, and sat beside
her son, Mikhail.
This was not the first time Putin brought Alexeyeva flowers. On a personal visit to her
Moscow apartment on her 90th birthday, he came with a bouquet. This was filmed and televised:
they exchanged words about Alexeyeva’s legacy. Alexeyeva used this platform to ask for mercy
for Igor Izmestyyev, a former senator who faced life imprisonment on unclear grounds. Putin
said he would see what could be done.
A founding member of the Moscow Group of Assistance to the Implementation of the
Helsinki Agreements in the USSR––also known as the Helsinki Watch Group––Alexeyeva had
been calling for accountability in the Soviet Union on an international scale since 1976. Her
prominent role in criticizing the Soviet leadership transformed her into a human rights icon.
Before taking a position of dissent against the Soviet system, Alexeyeva was studying Soviet key
figures as a public lecturer. She hosted popular lectures in Moscow, attracting crowds as large as
500 people.
Most prominently, she lectured about the war heroine Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya,
colloquially referred to as “Zoya.” A posthumous recipient of the Hero of the Soviet Union
award, Zoya was a partisan fighter in German-occupied territory during World War II. Zoya was
setting fire to what were believed to be Nazi-occupied stables. The tale goes that Nazis found
her, hanged her and disfigured her hanging body with bayonets. She is famed for her final words,
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“You can hang me now, but I’m not alone. There are two hundred million of us. You can’t hang
us all, they will avenge me.”

4

Through her research, Aleexeva accidentally debunked this story. She met Zoya’s
mother, who claimed that Zoya was turned over to the Nazis by angry Soviet farm laborers.

5

Zoya’s actions were reframed to Alexeyeva: Zoya was in the wrong territory, and the feud was
between the Soviets themselves. Alexeyeva’s research led her to view Zoya’s canonization as
demonstrating something deceptive in Soviet ideology, and caused her to reevaluate her own
political consciousness, outside the pro-forma Soviet mindset.
The Soviet woman, as a symbol, was glorified in accordance with the Soviet ideology, in
order to represent the ideal Soviet woman as a standard for behavior and compliance within the
system. In the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the image of the Russian woman as a
national symbol has been updated and adapted by passing political moments and ambitions.
There have been several shifts in the Russian ideology of gender: women’s status within society
has been impacted in terms of rights and policy, and concepts of the ideal have been adjusted.
Literature about Soviet war heroines plays an important role in Soviet ideology: heroines
epitomized the idea that the propagating of women was synonymous with the cause of the Soviet
system. Idealized images and symbolic people were a force for stability. The literature of the
political moment would shape the idealized Soviet woman.
Although the thread of hope and promise for gender equality runs through the political
history of the Soviet Union, the path to women’s self-determination through socialism was cut

4

Encyclopedia.com, “Zoya Kosmodemyanska, 1923-1941.” Last updated April 8, 2020.
https://www.encyclopedia.com/women/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/kosmodemyanskaya-zoya-19
23-1941
5
Lyubov Timofeeva Kosmodemyanskaya, Povest o Zoe u Shure. L
 ib.ru, accessed April 27, 2020.
http://lib.ru/PRIKL/PIONERY/zoyshura.txt
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short, along with aspiration for equal rights and freedom within society as a whole. Russian
women were a driving force in the destabilization of the Russian Empire. Many bourgeois
women, moved by Marxist ideology, became more politically involved in the lead-up to the
revolution and within the revolution itself than they had been prior. Many prerevolutionary
women joined the violent Marxist group Narodnoya Volya (The Peoples’ Will) which organized
and participated in political terrorism. Women were behind the assassination of Tsar Alexander
II: Vera Figner, Sophia Perovskaya and others were made famous through their participation in
revolutionary violence. The participation of women in political violence is a testimony to the
disbelief that the Tsarist Empire could offer real change: women were signing on to a major shift
in their social stature which was a tenet of the revolution––the elimination of bourgeois
womanhood. Historian Gail Lapidus writes that, “rejecting the path of legal political reform, and
therefore the tactics and goals of bourgeois feminism, the revolutionary socialist movement
6

insisted that the full liberation of women was inseparable from a larger social revolution.” After
the Bolsheviks defeated the Empire, Soviet women were officially made into major symbolic
representations of the cause and its promises––solidifying the idea that both Communism and
equality were generally intertwined. The foundation of revolution rested on the promise for
equality: the goal was to lay horizontal the harmful societal hierarchies from years of Tsarist
authoritarianism, wherein women were of secondary stature and marginalized per their ethnic
groups. The Bolsheviks, Lapidus writes, “insisted on their structural connection and proclaimed
the achievement of ethnic and sexual equality to be inextricably entwined with the revolutionary
reconstruction of society itself.”

7

Gail Lapidus, Women in Russia, ed. Atkinson, Dorothy; Dallin, Alexander; Lapidus, Gail Warshovsky. (San
Francisco: Stanford University Press, 1977): 2.
7
Ibid.
6
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Lenin called on women to participate in politics, stating that “the experience of all
liberation movements has shown that the success of a revolution depends on how much the
8

women take part in it.” Nadezhda Krupskaya, Lenin’s wife, helped pioneer the first
9

women-centric bureaucratic institution, the Zhenotdel, meaning women’s department. There
10

were conferences of Soviet Women, organized by Bolshevik feminist Inessa Armand. At the
11

conferences, Lenin called on women to be active members in Soviet society.

However, Lenin’s new statecraft and emancipation rhetoric only went as far as the
locations from which it was proclaimed––it did not reach the women laboring in the provinces.
In the early days of Lenin’s regime, provincial women, going about their daily tasks did not
know that they could be emancipated from peasant life and its traditional gender roles by joining
the party and moving up the ranks. Lapidus writes that Lenin’s statements only scratched the
surface, as proclamation “was only a first step in their real emancipation.” That emancipation,
however, was complicated by “the need to inform women of their new position and to draw them
into active participation in public life was even more fundamental and posed far greater problems
12

of innovation and leadership.”

The position of the Soviet government on women’s emancipation was redesigned during
the course of Joseph Stalin’s consolidation of power in the late 1920s. Stalin dissolved the
13

Zhenotdel i n 1930, saying that “the woman question had been solved.” The position of the
Kremlin was contradictory to the momentum of women’s involvement and engagement that had

Lapidus, Women in Russia, 63.
Christopher J. Ward, “Working Alone, Women on the Railway,” 71.
10
This is a retrospective use of the word. Many historians refer to Kollontai as a feminist, though the word would
not have been attributed to her during her time.
11
Lapidus, Women in Russia, 6 3.
12
Ibid.
13
Natasha Kolchevska, Angels in the Home and at Work: Russian Women in the Khrushchev Years, 115.
8
9
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been established prior, and Stalin was calling for a return to traditional gender roles. Lapidus
writes, “New obligations, roles, and opportunities for women were assimilated into older values
and patterns of behavior,” such as the woman’s return to the nuclear family (something that had
somewhat of a makeover under Lenin), and the fight against “Western ‘interference’ create an
14

amalgam of tradition and transformation” that did not signal progress under Stalin. The
momentum under Lenin blended with the imperial past; emancipation became even more of a
performance than it had been
prior. Women were to have
children.
Emancipation qua
performativity could be
exemplified by the Soviet
Women’s Committee.
Created in 1941, their role at
the time was, “to convince
foreign women’s delegations
of Soviet women’s high
economic and political
15

status.” Despite international Soviet propaganda announcing the superior condition of the
Soviet woman, on the home front, Stalin furthered pronatalism, producing domestic propaganda
that urged women to reproduce for nationalistic reasons, that their most important role was to be
14

Lapidus, 97.
Varlie Sperling, Organizing Women in Contemporary Russia, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999),
108.
15
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mothers. This message was especially prominent in the lead-up to World War II––with posters
depicting saintly mothers with Russian ethnic features, surrounded by children—mostly her sons.
16

These images of nationalistic maternity arrived in the context of the staggering death statistics

which shaped the prerogatives of the Soviet governments. Military casualties from World War II,
then still ongoing, were obscured by the toll of Stalin’s terror; the respective estimated death
17

counts are 11 million soldiers and 26 million Soviet citizens lost. Thus it was necessary for
propaganda persuading reproduction to be pointed and sentimentally triggering, as Russia left the
second World War in dire need of demographic regeneration. Reproduction was framed as
patriotism, so propaganda displayed the woman in her nationally-appointed role as both
idealistically Russian, and also as the admired object of her children and the nation.
After Stalin’s death, there was a power vacuum, ultimately filled by Nikita Khrushchev,
who ushered a period of Soviet history called the “thaw,” a cooling down of the remnants of
Stalinism––without much interest in addressing the stature of women. Women’s status in Soviet
society “remained of little interest to the dominant patriarchy, with the notable exception that it
18

lifted the prohibition on abortion in 1955,” though state propaganda highly discouraged
abortion, outlawed during the runup to World War II. The Kremlin’s messaging created the
appearance that the woman question had been answered. A Soviet political scientist, Vera
Bilshai, explained in 1959 in a state-sponsored work, The Solution of the Women’s Question in
the USSR: “the practical experience of nations within the socialist camp clearly confirms that the
complete liberation of women both as individuals and laborers has been attained as a result of the

Nina Vatolina, “Glory to the Mother Heroine!” Poster. 1944. Accessed from Life.ru, https://life.ru/p/1227735
Ishaan Tharoor, “Don’t forget how the Soviet Union saved the world from Hitler,” May 2015
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/05/08/dont-forget-how-the-soviet-union-saved-the-wo
rld-from-hitler/
18
Ward, “Working Alone,” 72.
16
17
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victory of socialism over capitalism.” This came after years of Stalinist repression.
Emancipation was not that simple.
The Thaw and post-war reconstruction meant not only rebuilding infrastructure but,
again, rebuilding the country through reproduction. Historian Christopher Ward writes that
women “were asked to perform equally at home and in public life, to both rebuild the home and
20

family and to step into the workplace as necessary” during the dramatic reconstruction of
Soviet society. Once again, women were responsible for upholding stability, but also
demonstrating that Soviet women were emancipated through the Soviet system, when policy was
not directly benefiting them:
women were placed at the center of ambivalent Khrushchevian pronatalist policies aimed
at reestablishing domestic ‘normalcy’ while also being expected to play a prominent role
in the public sphere, for example, in workplace unions and in political and social
21
organizations.
Then, in Brezhnev’s tenure, “the majority of Soviet women worked outside the home in
addition to undertaking such responsibilities as childbearing and rearing, which the state declared
22

to be the backbone of domestic society.” Women made up 80 percent of the railway workers,
and the railway became the icon of Brezhnev’s reconstruction progress. During this period,
women also bore the brunt of reconstruction through reproduction. Before beginning their shift
each day on the railway, women had to perform this affirmation:
I am a Komsomol woman. This gives me the right to choose my own career path. The
Komsomol membership card is a mandate, one that opens the door to true happiness, real
23
happiness both at work and leisure. I believe in Komsomol and I want to believe in me.

19

Ward, “Working Alone,” 72.
Ibid, 115.
21
Ibid.
22
Ibid, 73.
23
Ibid, 75.
20
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At the same time, Women were the target of widely-circulated jokes about selfish females who
wanted free time. This Brezhnev policy was one that had a significant and palpable impact:
“Coping with the tensions arising between different generations in overcrowded apartments was
primarily a female problem. This was because women had a greater investment in the home and
24

domestic life.” Again, women were tasked with the majority of reconstruction, all the while
being met with ambivalence about their roles in society beyond reproducing and laboring. Would
the majority male higher offices25 respond effectively, or would response be a performance?
For some, there are gradual build-ups to opinion, or clairvoyant defining moments
wherein their opinions crystalize. In Alexeyeva’s case, the Zoya incident made her realize more
than ever that her views did not align with those of the party; it was her self-proclaimed moment
26

in which she realized that she was a dissident. She knew people in Moscow circles who also
disagreed with Soviet power, and ultimately, with physicist Yuri Orlov, Alexeyeva became a
founding member of the Moscow Helsinki Watch Group. Alexeyeva helped to orchestrate a
small handful of men and women openly calling for change; and as the Helsinki Watch Groups
popped up across Soviet satellite states, she became the first of many female dissidents
organizing in opposition to the system.
The response to Alexeyeva and other dissidents as time has passed from the Soviet era to
today’s Putinist authoritarianism exposes a pattern between the image of male power and
women’s policy centered around an image of women’s submission and fecundity. Expectations
did not always reflect reality. But demands of accountability and better policy are placated by the

Lynne Attwood, “The Brezhnev Years” in Gender and Housing in Soviet Russia: Private Life in a Public Space,
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2010), 188.
25
For numbers on women’s seats in the Duma and presence in the higher offices of the Politburo and Central
Committee, see pages 48-49.
26
Paul Goldberg tape archive, interviews with Alexeyeva.
24
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government’s ways of creating the symbolic woman through many regimes, and both Soviet and
modern Russia’s societal leveraging of symbolic, yet ideologically docile women.
How do widely-proliferated images of the Russian man affect political consciousness in
contemporary Russia? To what extent do these images jeopardize womens’ issues and seek to
further the imbalance of gender relations? In the following chapters, I assess contemporary
Russia’s political relationship with women’s policy by analyzing the image of Russian power as
it relates to women, and the Putin administration’s performativity on women’s legislation.
Putinist politics offer their own ideal: they depict the female as a sexualized pinup, the
submissive supermodel, who is politically monogamous with amorphous Putinist ideology, who
bears children to fix the current demographic problem. The notion of upward mobility for
women exists in that it requires compliance with the Kremlin, and employs sexualization as a
strategy to validate the Putin regime.
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Chapter One. Sex for the State
1.1 Putinism as Stability
Condoms were not sold at Seliger, a lakeside spot 200 miles from Moscow chosen for the
now-inactive nationalist youth group Nashi (meaning “Our People”) annual camp summit. The
27

Seliger summit began in 2005 with 5,000 campers, which exploded to 15,000 by 2011. Young
adults attended early morning group cardio, lectures, and met with like-thinking young adults.
The Seliger attendees are encouraged to marry in mass weddings, buy Nashi-brand T-Shirts that
say “I Want Three,” (as in, three children) and were encouraged to procreate in an armada of
pink tents on a barge called the “Love Oasis.” Male opposition leaders were depicted on posters
wearing women’s lingerie in what is called a “Red Light District” on camp base. Dissidents and
oppositionists were depicted with their heads on sticks––one such stick portrays Alexeyeva in a
Nazi Wermarcht cap. This is what state-funded political legitimation looks like: Putin’s cult of
personality is consolidated and validated through Nashi––his attractiveness fortified by the
motives of Nashi.
Putin’s relationship with power relies on these legitimation strategies. This is
demonstrated by the political culture that surrounds him, that wields his image as a leader: the
culture of unitary decision-making, futility of the democratic process, and the oligarchy that
28

benefits from the structure of power in Russian politics. Putin’s image has been crafted and
29

consolidated by his allies; and furthered by interventionism and rhetoric that confirms his role
as a protector. The headquarters of Set––m
 eaning Network––the youth group that followed in
Valerie Sperling, Sex, Politics, and Putin, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 153.
Sam Greene and Graeme Robertson, Putin v. The People, ( New Haven: Yale University Press, 2019), 31.
29
Janet Elise Johnson and Aino Saarinen, “Twenty-First-Century Feminisms: Gender Regime Change and the
Women’s Crisis Center Movement in Russia” in Signs, Vol 38, (Spring 2013), 548.
27

28
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Nashi’ s wake, has walls adorned with photoshopped pictures of the leader wearing a bear pelt as
30

a hat, and a shocking image of him holding a strand of DNA.

Putinism as it is today, however, would not have been possible without the tenure of
Boris Yeltsin. When Yeltsin came to power in 1991, advertised as a staunch populist, he was
seen as a possible bulwark of democratic change after almost 75 years of the Soviet system. But
after some time, it became evident that Yeltsin would not bring the population of Russia to
stability: his promises of returning wealth went unfulfilled, he created faulty policy and furthered
the economic disparities posed by perestroika.
Yeltsin introduced “shock therapy,” which suggested that the new system would mellow
after an obligatory shock period with the deregulation of all prices. With oversight from the
economist Yegor Gaidar, Yeltsin’s government introduced budget cuts in order to achieve fiscal
balance. These austerity measures led to deficits and inflation, government services stopped
31

serving, and unemployment was rampant throughout the country. Oligarchs bought out state
companies for cheap, and their resources were sold cheaply in the international marketplace.
Family savings were worthless: they held no value in Yeltsin and Gaidar’s economic experiment.
As Russia scholar Fiona Hill writes, “the economy as a whole shifted from a growth and
development orientation to pure survival. On a private level, Russian households did the same.
32

But publicly there was outrage.”

Then came the power vested into the Presidential seat. Despite parliament pushing
through their own drafts of a new democratic constitution, Yeltsin’s team managed to forward a

Voice of America, “Pro-Kremlin Youth Group Creatively Promotes ‘Patriotic’ Propaganda,” YouTube, January
25, 2015. https://www.YouTube.com/watch?v=MABie5BU7yA
31
Fiona Hill and Clifford G. Gaddy, “Boris Yelstin and the Time of Troubles” in Mr. Putin: The Operative in the
Kremlin, (Brookings Institution Press, 2013), 18.
32
Ibid, 18.
30
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draft that gave the presidential seat domestic and foreign policy power, and “retroactively
legitimized many of the steps he had taken (excluding the military action) to curb the powers of
33

parliament.” Thus, Russia was pivoting from a promise of democracy to a governing policy that
upheld unitary executive power.
Chaos, poverty, and crisis was the mood of the Yeltsin administration; this atmosphere
was responsible for creating the modern oligarchy. The word “embarrassing” is often used to
describe his tenure. As he
ascended to power in 2000,
Putin was packaged and sold
as the savior of Russia,
promising to end what
Yeltsin’s critics called “the
34

time of troubles.” The
Kremlin acts as the craftsman
of the Putinist image––and
with its control of news and
media, Putin’s strongman
image is propagated to seem much larger than life––the quintessential Russian man.
Photos released and curated by the Kremlin and state-affiliated groups show Putin in
action, and proclaim support. Among the many examples is the 2010 birthday calendar35 (above)

Hill and Gaddy, Mr. Putin, 2 1.
A reference to the leaderless days of old Russia, 1598-1613, before the Romanovs’ Empire began.
35
Left reads: “Vladimir Vladimirovich, every man should be like you.” Right: “Vladmir Vladimirovich, how about
a third time?” Accessed from NY Daily News:
33
34
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gifted to him by students and alumni of the journalism department of Moscow State University.
In this calendar, women model underwear, and each has a speech bubble declaring their love for
Putin, who is referred to by his first name and patronymic, Vladimir Vladimirovich. This project
“served not only to publicly assert Putin’s support from a group of young women but also to
36

highlight Putin’s machismo.” British supermodel Naomi Campbell interviewed Putin for GQ
Magazine, and of the calendar he said:
I like the girls a lot, they're beautiful. I like the calendar but it's not the most important
thing. As for the other one, well, in almost any country, probably in Russia in particular,
it's fashionable to criticise people in power. If you come out in support of someone like
me, you're going to be accused of trying to ingratiate yourself. The girls in the erotic
calendar were courageous and they were not scared. As student journalists, they couldn't
fail to understand what might have been said to them after doing this. Nonetheless, they
37
were not deterred and did the calendar anyway. So, frankly, that's what I liked the most.
Russia historian Valerie Sperling notes that sexualization and gender norms become tools
of both the pro-Putin groups and the oppositionist groups: the tools and rhetoric are deployed
from either side. Activists on both sides “have chosen to wield concepts of femininity,
masculinity, and homophobia (heteronormativity) as tools in their political organizing efforts.”
Sperling continues, “political actors incorporated gender norms in their authority-building
‘toolboxes’ because of the accessibility and resonance of these aspects of cultural identity at elite
38

and mass levels alike.” The use of sex as a mechanism for debate is further discussed in the
next section, 1.3.

https://www.nydailynews.com/life-style/happy-birthday-mr-putin-russian-college-co-eds-pose-sexy-lingerie-calenda
r-pm-birthday-article-1.191352
36
Sperling, Sex, Polititcs, and Putin, 95.
37
Naomi Campbell, “When Naomi Campbell Interviewed Vladimir Putin,” GQ, November 11, 2017.
https://www.gq-magazine.co.uk/article/vladimir-putin-interview-naomi-campbell
38
Sperling, Sex, Politics, and Putin, 2.
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In the context of women’s issues, Putin is widely portrayed as reliable and reassuring, but
behind this veneer are sinister mechanisms for legitimation. His political legitimacy is drawn
from the solidification of gender roles:
One of the most frequently encountered strategies is to emphasize patriotism and
nationalism, as the Putin regime chose to do. Nationalism and patriotism, in turn, are
closely tied up with gender norms––perceptions about what constitutes “correct” sex
39
roles about masculinity and femininity within a given national population.
This is not a passive choice: Sperling argues that nationalism and patriotism are inherently tied to
gender norms; as nationalism and patriotism are the idealization of the state as it exists. This is
amplified by the many media machines in the country with validating power: state television,
newspapers, and pro-state (and partially state-funded) groups, such as Nashi. Sperling writes of
how those responsible for making Putin’s image have “seized on a model of attractive, physical
40

masculinity as a way to set Russia’s current leadership apart” from the physicalities of past
leaders.
Political ads depict Putin’s dominance, and portray him as a protector for women––but
his campaigns sexualize women’s votes by “tapping into a common heteronormative
understanding of gender roles whereby women seek out male lovers to protect them (from harsh
41

economic realities and from possible violence and sexual predation at the hands of other men).”

Thus, the legitimation model taps into sinister gender issues, and calibrates national issues (such
as the widespread occurrences and lack of legal prosecution over domestic violence) to their
benefit.
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The rhetoric of deeply pronatalist policies seeps into the home. Putin’s brand of
conservative nationalism “has pushed back against sexual liberalization, reanimated by Putin’s
42

campaigns to get women to have more children in order to save the nation-state.” Herein lies
his manipulation of women’s policy, bolstered by his image as a protector of women: “Portrayed
as the ‘toughest’ political figure, Putin offered the best protection from dangers visible and
43

invisible; women were ‘safest’ affiliating themselves with him politically.”

Of course, this regime change carried vast social implications. The comfort taken in the
idea of stability––here: gender roles––can be understood in the context of the tumultuous era that
preceded it. Perestroika and glasnost were the centrifuges of social change in the Soviet Union:
Soviet everyday life was turned on its head on many levels––economic, social, and political.
There was no roadmap for the everyday Soviet person in the upheaval of all things Soviet––there
was no universal exit strategy for the lifelong welfare system.

1.2 Social Movements, From the Tumultuous 90s Onward
44

A “brief broadening of sexuality and gender norms as the Soviet regime liberalized”

before Yeltsin’s ascent to office. Years of enabling rhetoric and rampant political machismo
impeded the ability of feminist movements to gain traction and affect policy. Women’s
movements were reluctant to call themselves feminist. Yeltsin’s and Putin’s “conservative
nationalism” has, as political scientists Johnson and Saarinen argue, “pushed back against sexual
liberalization, reanimated by Putin’s campaigns to get women to have more children in order to
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save the nation state.” Yeltsin approached women’s policy with maternalism, and spoke of
women’s issues as those solely associated with the production of children.
Contemporary Russian culture and social movement building cannot be understood
without the dissident movement of the 70s. Between Krushchev’s Thaw and Gorbachev’s
perestroika, the Moscow Helsinki Watch Group was created. The United States and the Soviet
Union had forged a contract, wherein they became signatories so that they could trade again.
Yuri Orlov, a physicist who had always been on thin ice with the KGB, had read the Helsinki
Accords published in full in Pravda a nd had seen the potential for implementing his movement
as an “assistance group” in 1975. He had asked Alexeyeva to join him in this. She became the
backbone of the group, and her name later became a metonym for the movement. The Soviet
human rights groups were often nicknamed by Western media the “dissidents.” Here, it is
necessary to note the difference between outspoken dissent and passive dissent. Helsinki Watch
was outspoken––they organized publicly (as well as took to means such as publishing samizdat
and having private meetings) to express dissent from the government’s choices––while passive
occurs in the minds of people as a personal state of disagreement. There are stages of dissent,
and there are discrete dissenting actions performed by individuals unwilling to be publicly
identified as dissidents.
At this same moment, society saw a rebirth of the women’s councils that had died out in
46

the 1920s, the zhensovety. The purpose of those unions was to be “transmission belts.” They
were “to engage women’s support of Communist Party policies, and also took on service
provision.” But on the whole, the office was not a legal organization concerned with women’s
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rights––rather, it reinforced performative roles that had suffused previous eras. Zhensovety and
the Soviet Women’s Council were not considered to be “defending women’s rights, or increasing
women’s involvement in political or economic decisionmaking.”

47

This ran parallel to the newly-attained ability to organize. On perestroika, Alexeyeva
wrote: “no one could have predicted that his policies in the Kremlin would reflect the ideas of
our younger days.” Before perestroika, social action came with major penalties. Society had been
deeply atomized, and any sort of organizing was illegal. Alexeyeva continued:
Now, my contemporaries who have not rotted away in their hideouts have joined in
perestroika. I wish them success. All of us shared the bitterness of the Stalin era, and that
shared experience gives us hope that the current warming will be more than a thaw in the
48
midst of winter.
Thus, perestroika gave way to group organizing, and women’s groups took this into account
when attempting to make their own spaces under the reforms of the late 1980s that introduced
the possibility of freedom of speech and freedom of association. Until then, Sperling writes that
49

“women in the Soviet Union had been essentially voiceless.” However, these new groups
advocating for transparency often did not address the nature of gender difference within political
struggle.
In the dissident movement’s peak in the 1970s, there was a profound current toward
equality and global attention to human rights-based accountability. Women’s rights were
conflated with human rights: this was not unfamiliar to the Soviet tradition of binding women’s
rights to the revolution. Within that context, the dissident movement did not have any special
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projects that addressed the issue of gender inequality. When asked about her beliefs in feminism,
Alexyeva responded that fighting for women’s rights and fighting for human’s rights were the
same thing.
But her criticism did not stray from calling the moment for what it was. In this new
political space, social movements and groups formed as their own atoms in a space of general
chaos and economic insecurity. In her book Soviet Dissent: Contemporary Movements for
National, Religious, and Human Rights, Alexyeva writes of social movements in 1984:
Previously amorphous political dissent had crystallized into several trends, including
political ones, a majority of them transitional between those that are political and those
that lead away from it. As a result of the physical removal from social activism of the
activists of the early phase of dissent, and as a result of its own politicization, the moral
potential of dissent was lowered. The dispersal of the human rights movement led to an
accentuation in the national movements of egoistic, chauvinistic and xenophobic moods,
50
and, in the religious movements, of a move away from concern about social problems.
Alexeyeva makes the argument that the authorization of social movements thus lowered their
moral power––and that dissent itself was politicized to further self-interest rather than larger
social issues of the moment. Social upheaval and social change were linked in unfortunate
circumstances: the women’s movement in Russia sought to “achieve a variety of cultural,
political, and economic goals while suffering from insufficient resources and internal divisions
51

and conflicts between activists.”

There was space to build change and reliability, to be heard, but it was happening at the
same time as the nation was going through a shocking shift. This challenging reality brought to
light the social realities at hand, and mobilized people to think in a larger social context: “the
changing economic situation and the stark appearance of unemployment, especially among
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educated women, brought discrimination into the open, fueling changes in consciousness for
52

activists, and possibly for women in the population at large.” Thus, people mobilized according
to their own beliefs on gender equality and social change: “Women activists across the political
53

spectrum began to organize in their own interests, separately from men.”

Several glasnost-era women’s magazines began to talk about patriarchal politics. In 1991,
Moskvichka, a women’s magazine with a circulation of 175,000 printed valuable statistics on the
amount of women in leadership roles in the new economy, the small percentages on upward
mobility within jobs, and even percentages on women who were overqualified for their jobs.
Many women’s magazines popped up, and discussed similar issues, such as Delovia zhenshina
54

(meaning Businesswoman), Novaya zhenshina (New Woman). Women’s studies as an
academic possibility was opened, despite some opposition from academics and institutions.
There had been past literature on gender roles in the USSR, a “huge outpouring in the 1970s of
candidate degree dissertations on the position of women in the USSR,” but it did not disseminate
as widely as the short-lived magazines. The idea of women’s studies, writes historian Mary
Buckley, “had always smacked of ‘bourgeois feminism,’ and had thus been ideologically
55

unsound.” But their conversation was not universal, as the pressure of perestroika was taxing to
those raised in Soviet mindsets. Many women, “worn out from the pressures of daily life,
56

remained indifferent to new discussions of gender roles.” Decades of the Soviet Union’s
demonization of feminism––and the absence of a women’s right’s movement to criticize
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them––made this seem normal. Again, even popular and provocative dissidents did not call
themselves feminists.
Valentina Konstantinova, one of the first activists to label herself a feminist, wrote of the
importance of the vacuum created by perestroika; this, she believed, was a moment to organize
en masse, and a time of potential for immense social change. Konstantinova, though, wrote that
not enough movement towards progress was being made by those passive to the cause: “We
must admit that women have so far not made use of this historic opportunity to change their
status. We must take into consideration that gender relations in politics are tied to gender
57

relations in other fields.” Many people were talking about the possibility of change, but not
enough movement was being made.
Sperling writes of a meeting of a 1995 perestroika womens’ discussion group called Klub
Garmoniya––Club Harmony. This was one of many small groups that took on issues of social
change, “reclaiming their ‘femininity’ in a post-totalitarian world –– one whose ideology did its
best to eliminate gender distinctions, while in reality it reinforced women’s sense of inferiority in
58

all areas of life: politics, society, the economy, the home.” Klub Garmoniya and other groups
like Feminist Alternative, and Klub F-1 (First Feminist Club), had no cultural preparedness for
the task of movement building outside of government structures, but they held actively-attended
59

consciousness-raising meetings about feminism. However, it was not so much about generating
actor numbers, rather, initiating change through avenues that did not necessitate massive
60

numbers.
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Sperling argued that the mid-1990s women’s movement was “flourishing, even as it
61

[struggled] within its social, political, economic, historical, and international contexts.” While,
in its moment it did flourish, there was a lot at hand. There was the consequence that there may
be hope for international accountability, thanks to the leadership and the prior dissident
movement. However, grassroots movements did not build momentum as anticipated:
Simultaneously, the women’s movement has emerged into an actively interventionist
international and transnational environment, which provides intellectual contacts,
financial support, and even a degree of domestic legitimation for activists in Russia.
Driven by the lack of an economic infrastructure to support grassroots social movements,
women’s organizations in Russia are increasingly turning to international sources of
62
support, which bring with them a host of benefits as well as unintended side effects.
The shift to democracy did not entail a smooth transition to movement-building––the social and
economic contexts were not allowing for the smoothest of transitions toward a women’s
movement like that of the women’s movements in Western democracies: the argument being that
too much was going on, people were barely making ends meet, that an immense social
movement was not on the radar. People were looking for accountable leadership.
Sex and sexuality became a part of the open dialogue of the perestroika and
postperestroika periods. In her 1994 essay The Mythology of Womanhood, Olga Lipovskaya
writes: “Women are now no longer forbidden to be sexy––on the contrary, their sexuality is
much encouraged.” Sexiness is encouraged because, Lipovskaya argues, it is deeply rooted in
patriarchal culture: “Together with the image of good wife and mother, this model is now being
63

promoted as the real, feminine woman so dear to Russian male culture.”
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These images cut even deeper, according to Lipovskaya. The Soviet system, though
performative in its promises of equality, was able to offer women some benefits. The commercial
moment did not do so: “Having stripped women of the military uniform and modest suits of the
totalitarian past, our culture is now creating a conventional image of compliant, sexualized
femininity so dear to men’s hearts––submissive, tender or passionate, as the client orders.”

64

The Kremlin has since changed course about how to respond to this kind of open
dialogue. Putin’s first-term chief political adviser Gleb Pavlovsky (fired in 2011) was quoted as
saying: “The Kremlin tended to see its role as preventing [dissent] from emerging––avoiding
‘public excitement’––and thus maintaining the loyalty of all but the most marginal social
65

groups.” This was updated toward the end of 2011:
the Kremlin recognized that [suppressing opposition] was no longer working, and it soon
set out to create and manipulate ideological cleavages to its own advantage. The goal was
to find issues that could ‘weaponize’ an existing but dormant social consensus against the
opposition to the advantage of the regime. This is an old political technique, commonly
used in Western democracies, that political strategists refer to as mobilizing ‘wedge
issues’––issues that are not central to the usual axes of political competition, but that can
cleave off part of an opponent’s potential support. And in Russia, as elsewhere, wedge
66
issues mean bringing up the previously unmentionable––religion and sexuality.
Today, demonstration laws in Russia prohibit the public from organizing “unauthorized”
protests, much like in the Soviet era. The ban has been challenged by the internationally known
punk-dissent band Pussy Riot, at each of their Putin-slamming concerts. Harsh punishment and
imprisonment followed. This correlates with something Pavlovsky said in the New Left Review,
after years of working directly with Putin, commenting on the need for such a Putinist strongman
image by the Kremlin since Yeltsin’s 1993 bombing of the Parliament; “there has been an
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absolute conviction that as soon as the power centre shifts, or if there is mass pressure, or the
appearance of a popular leader, then everybody will be annihilated.” Insecurity about potential
insurrection was and remains a motivating force in Kremlin psychology.

1.3 Making Putin Sexy and Humiliating Opposition
In a Washington Post piece of the power of the image of Putin as a leader, Pavlovsky
stressed the importance of image for a leader of a weak state: “We intensified Putin’s mystery on
67

purpose.” He said: “You need to create an image of power.” This reveals much about the nature
of his power, and the weakness of the state, that images of Putin must be curated. Taking a
casual photo of Putin in Russia is not permitted. This says something about the staging and
crafting of his presidential image. His images proliferate through the media and convey national
stability and other moralistic messages. Externally, they convey Russia’s stance as a superpower,
interventionist, and a force to be reckoned with.
Sperling writes of sexualization’s association with materialism:
The sexualization of economic products starting in Russia in the 1990s helped lay the
groundwork for the sexualization of political products, such as candidates and their
supporters. During the Putin era, the gender norms relied upon for advertising and image
68
making in the economic sphere crossed into the political realm.
By this token, images of women in leadership positions do not proliferate in the same way. In the
Duma, the strongest image is of staunch Senator Elena Mizulina––who dresses very
conservatively in pearls and skirt suits, and touts the importance of conservative values; an
ideology that has shifted with time and opportunity,69 like the waves between open dialogue and
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social conservatism. Sex politics are welcomed by the Kremlin––as long as they employ sex as
an inroad to furthering Putinism. Mizulina represents a brand of conservatism which appears to
be in contest with that of the women in Putin’s birthday calendar––but they work in concert with
each other, in that they are politically monogamous with Putin’s administration.
Additionally, images of dissidents are highly sexualized. With “Red Light District” of
Seliger camp alongside the images of dissidents on sticks in fascist attire, Putinist criticism has
commercial value when it meets its willing audience. Thus, if one does not fit in with the Putin
brand with their dialogue, one does not fit at all.
While the government uses sexuality to advance its practices, so do the dissidents––but
their intentions are to subvert the Kremlin. An overt example is Pussy Riot’s 2008 orgy video,
filmed in protest of interim-President Dmitri Medvedev’s call for families to have more children
70

in order to fix the demographic problem. Medvedev was at the time the Presidential candidate
for United Russia ––the Duma party which backed Putin until it was dissolved in 2020 as a
strategy for continuing Putin’s tenure. The orgy strategically waged the rhetoric they expected to
be waged against them, to the figures in power who employ it; demonstrating a lack of fear of
retaliation. Pussy Riot founder Nadezhda Tolokonnikova was pregnant at the time of the filming,
and to make matters more ironic, the orgy was at the Moscow State Biological Museum, and the
video was titled Yebis’ za naslednika Medvezhonka (“Fuck for the Heir Teddy-Bear”). The
Kremlin’s wielding of sexual image comes with an overt desire to advance conservative gender
values, to show the activities of the real Russian man, and send them through the media. Images
of Putin, shirtless, riding a horse, come with their own political agenda. Therefore, the
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obsequious, ironic elements of the orgy video carried massive rhetorical significance, subverting
the Kremlin’s expectations of social behavior and submission. Making sex––group sex at that––a
political protest that challenges pink tents for the nationalist Nashi n ewlyweds to procreate.
The “ideal,” then, maintains its place in Russian political culture through this kind of
media saturation. This connects with the failure to adopt effective women’s policy by creating
the ideal, passive pinup. Thus, if you do not fit into the ideal subordinate, there is no place for
you.
The images that have been woven through state media since the Soviet era have created
model citizens whose needs cannot be addressed by the government. They can be met through
adapting to subordination, or even bargaining within the system. Idealized imagery is a
soft-power tool to subordinate real life––they operate as a Potemkin Villages to model something
that is not present within society, something missing; and to placate real needs and real
problems; proposing short-term or unreal solutions to real problems.
With Putin’s ascendance to power came a return, once again, to women’s traditional
roles. From the still-present cultural memory of perestroika came many social movements, and
some liberalization of gender and sexual norms. Political scientists Janet Elise Johnson and Aino
Saarinen write of the power of his public image, which relies on “using his own brand of
masculinity to embolden the national psychology and to legitimate more muscular intervention
71

into all aspects of people’s lives.” Putin’s government has crafted the look and behavior of the
ideal Russian man after Putin himself.
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The landscape of gender roles in Putin’s government policies and reforms, Johnson and
Saarinen write, “is a gender ideology similar to the materrnalist script employed under Yeltsin,
albeit newly fortified with pronatalisms, the language of self-help and neoliberal individualism,
72

and Orthodox Christian Nationalism.” Russia, from Brezhnev onwards, has been concerned
“that the emancipation of women (such as it was) had feminized and weakened men.” In place of
Soviet heroines and symbols came a focus on heroic men in the period of transition: “there were
prominent stories of heroic masculinity, exceptional real Russian men who had done the
73

impossible for their nation.” The patriarchal values of Soviet society are correlated to the
legacy of Soviet gender role expectations. Historian and Gender Studies scholar Ludmilla
Popkova argues that “researchers should pay more attention to the subjective and discursive
74

constraints on women’s political choices from a perspective of post-Soviet cultural transition.”
The order of Soviet society in the transition from perestroika to the present moment

required the adjustment from explicit gender roles to implicit ones. Popkova writes that the state,
during the Soviet era, “institutionalized a distinctive order in which the roles of men and women
were defined according to the needs of the communist state. The state-prescribed Soviet gender
75

order had a significant impact on the subjective perceptions of men and women.” This has not
been undone with time. The way in which the state has constructed the ideal human, both Soviet
and post-Soviet, illustrates the legacy of the ideal within Soviet culture. With every new leader,
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gender roles have been molded to fit the issues of the moment. As for Putin, he has restored
traditional values by appealing to idealized sexuality.
This has worked intergenerationally and across several contexts within gender identity
and sexual preference. Popokova writes:
Many researchers have shown that the gender identities even of the younger generation
are still strongly influenced by Soviet values. There are certain common themes in their
perceptions of women’s roles. These include the acceptance of supposedly natural sexual
differences, which leads to perceiving a woman’s secondary position in all spheres as
natural. Sociological surveys show that despite negative assesments of their chances in
76
the labor market in politics, women rarely claim that they face discrimination.
The patriarchal system leaves no room for an honest reckoning with contemporary women’s
issues. Scholar and former director of the Moscow Center for Gender Studies, Olga Voronina
writes in her 1993 essay, Soviet Patriarchy: Past and Present, “In the framework of a patriarchal
culture, a strong man can exist only in conjunction with a weak woman; her weakness is the
77

basis of his strength.” This is exactly what idealized images of gender roles seek to do. It’s as if
Putin is Russia’s one and only role model:
Patriarchy, the masculinist paradigm, is a system of standardization of the individual
through gender, the ascription and prescription to a person of certain sexual parameters in
behavior, thought, feeling and perception. This relates to men as well, who are likewise
not free from gender prohibitions (for instance, the open expression of feelings) or
prescriptions (always to be active and successful). In the framework of a patriarchal
culture, a strong man can exist only in conjunction with a weak woman; her weakness is
the basis of his strength. For all intents and purposes, the patriarchal culture creates the
woman as a victim and the man as an aggressor, but both the one and the other suffer
78
from this.”
Voronina argues that patriarchal culture breeds a system that subjugates the sexes to be
organized within society. With the strongman image comes the image of the woman who is
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unable to be as strong. This is in association with something said by Pavlovsky, Putin’s former
image-maker, that the image of a leader of a weak and challenged state needs to be that of a
strongman.
Society has not seen a female leader of similar stature in the modern era. Female leaderly
images, like that of senator Mizulina, are prim and pearl-wearing, conservative––in a state organ
that puts forth hard-line policies that do not prioritize gender equality.
Per Pavlovsky, the wielding of image in a weak state is important to the state’s internal
and geopolitical stability. Putin’s brand is part of a careful, patriarchal playbook. Highly defined
sex roles are a state necessity. Those that contribute to his branding through various campaigns,
youth groups, and the like weave these roles into the fabric of government.

1.4 Commercializing Legitimacy
Creating media featuring women as prizes, depicting supermodel-like women making
gifts of themselves for Putin, is a popular way of aligning oneself with the state and gaining
respect of peers. Sycophants buy into Putin’s affections through the creation of media that
features him as desired, or sexualizes him. As discussed in the introduction, the Putin birthday
calendar is a case in point. Groups of women, aligned to the image of supermodels with
79

ethnically Russian features, like “Putin’s Army” and the “Medvedev Girls” are examples of
80

this. These widespread gimmicks carry their own agendas; and many have state funding.

Nashi r an a state-funded ad campaign for Putin in the 2012 elections, depicting a woman
seeking advice on “doing it” for the first time, saying that she needed to be sure it was with a

79
80

Sperling, Sex, Politics, and Putin, 99.
Ibid.

Goldberg 36
81

man she cared about, who would treat her right. It became clear that “doing it” meant voting.
Each person from whom the woman sought advice told her that she had made the right choice,
82

that she “would be ‘safe’ with the man she chose.”

In 2013, when Medvedev was interim President, he signed a bill banning public alcohol
consumption, specifically beer sold in park kiosks, and the Medvedev Girls responded with a
campaign in a public park where they had men pour out cans of beer into a bucket. The higher
liquid in the bucket got, the more items of clothing the Medvedev Girls took off.

83

This propaganda in its many forms acts as a legitimation tool for the state. Though the
state does much of its own legitimation, this kind is legitimation at a remove, that evokes a sense
84

of stability within an otherwise insecure political leadership. Sperling writes about glamour’s
role in modern Russia, stressing the value of this kind of gift:
Glamour played well in the new capitalist economy, though it would rise to the fore in
politics only after Yeltsin’s exodus, when Putin evolved into something of a glamour
object. Putin became ‘a major––indeed, perhaps the ultimate––sex symbol’ of a new
political regime resting on a new economic order. Glamour was now a selling point, and
85
political leaders as well as economic goods could be desired and consumed.
Women, gifting themselves to Putin and Medvedev, locate themselves in the Putinist legitimate
order. If sex sells, then why not capitalize? Branding oneself alongside the state becomes a
lucrative practice. Appealing to the Putinist brand is a way for one to garner power in such a
system. Glamour and branding that validates the government is an asset to the Kremlin; which is
why it comes as no surprise that both Nashi and Set h ad their own fashion designers. Set e ven
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held a 2015 fashion show, displaying attire by “patriotic designers.” Defense Minister Sergei
Shoygu thought to create a brand to popularize the military and generate a fanbase. This resulted
87

in the outlet store, Armiya Rossii. The marketing of patriotism taps into cultural memory and
emotion. For the younger patriots, it markets sex and war as excitement. Such commercial excess
is no problem to the Kremlin when it validates the state, and effectively generates propaganda at
a remove.

1.5 Hegemonic Masculinity

Sociologists R.W. Connell and James W. Messerschmidt offer a valuable tool for
analyzing contemporary Russia through the concept of“hegemonic masculinity.” The structure
and system of contemporary legitimation strategies can be analyzed through each of these three
frameworks, offered by Conell and Messerschmidt:
1. Local: constructed in the arenas of face-to-face interaction of families, organizations, and
immediate communities, as typically found in ethnographic and life-history research;
2. Regional: constructed at the level of the culture or the nation-state, as typically found in
discursive, political, and demographic research; and
3. Global: constructed in transnational arenas such as world politics and transnational
business and media, as studied in the emerging research on masculinities and
88
globalization.
Concepts of masculinity within the realm of wealth and power in Russia can be applied to the
current hegemony of male power today through the local, regional and global distinctions. Even
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with the ambiguities associated with definitions of hegemonic masculinity and non-hegemonic
masculinity, one can understand the proliferation of power with the lack of any cohesive
pushback. Emboldened by alliance with the Russian Orthodox Church and the Putinist brand of
leadership, hegemonic masculinity in contemporary Russia operates on each level of Connell and
Messerschmidt’s distinctions.
Nonetheless, it would be misleading to attribute this to “Russian culture.” Several
analyses of Putin’s style of masculinity have shown that his chosen brand is one that is
manicured and focus-grouped. This aligns with the concept posed by Connell and Messerschmidt
that the masculinity at play does not necessarily have to represent all masculinities––just those
that can benefit from spreading a masculine image, in order to obtain certain gains from
systematic gender placements. Putin’s solidification of masculinity within Russian leadership
runs parallel to the issue itself: the stability of the leaders’ masculine image with the perceived
stability of his very leadership. The proliferation and popularity of Putin’s image––with the help
of such images of him and his various adventure-seeking hobbies––display a gender performance
used for political propaganda. Political scientist Tatiana Zhurzhenko asks in an article for
89

Eurozine, “Can alternative masculinities in Russia point to political alternatives to Putin?”

Instilling normativity rather than normalcy, Putin struck a chord by addressing through
his own hobbies and habits what society was lacking, modeling himself as the ideal to what
Russian men ought to be. The motivating principle was that “it embodied the most honored way
of being a man, it required all other men to position themselves in relation to it, and ideologically
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roles and performances was keeping “traditional” roles in place. Such actions, and the lack of
oversight through cohesive checks and balances, showed that gender politics in Russia could
continue as such.
Thus, that which is left ambiguous and unsaid is precisely what makes all the difference.
Connell and Messerschmidt write of male images at the regional level: “There is a circulation of
models of admired masculine conduct,” and such models can be “exalted by churches, narrated
by mass media, or celebrated by the state. Such models refer to, but also in various ways distort,
91

the everyday realities of social practice.” These models idealize certain masculine
characteristics, in order to produce more of them and celebrate certain gender performances of
masculinity over others. This can be seen in the meetings of various nationwide youth groups,
especially in the days of the Nashi Summit at Seliger, when male campers were encouraged to
bend cast-iron pans with their bare hands.
The counterargument to this phenomenon is that Putin is offering a model of
responsibility and behavior in a state where alcoholism and domestic violence run rampant.
Incident reporting is complicated by the lack of legal protections. A study in 2014 estimated that
92

every year 14,000-15,000 women were killed annually by abusive partners. Authorities do not
disclose these numbers definitively and abuse statistics are likely much higher than their annual
estimates.93
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Such ambiguity makes space for stagnant policy. With the power of hegemonic
masculinity; policy neglect is not a symptom of such governance but a product. Connell and
Messerschmidt write:
Because the concept of hegemonic masculinity is based on practice that permits men’s
collective dominance over women to continue, it is not surprising that in some contexts,
hegemonic masculinity actually does refer to men’s engaging in toxic
practices––including physical violence––that stabilize gender dominance in a particular
94
setting.
Thus, the absence of a deeper look and analysis of women’s policy issues is problematized by
the fact that this situation works for men in leadership positions, and perhaps even for the women
that have taken steps to orient themselves within it. Hegemonic masculinity within the context of
domestic violence, which will be discussed in Chapter 2, is one such problem where stagnant
policy and the image of male power work in unison. Permitting male dominance, which the Putin
administration has encouraged, parallels with the global appearance of Russia.
The mass-produced images of Putin carry their own political agenda: they seek to
impress upon people a sense of stability after years of discomfort. The images also seek to show
one type of person: a man, with ethnically Russian features, who is sovereign in the sense that he
can fish, he can hunt, he can even scuba-dive. He is a man who hunts, fishes, rides motorcycles
and horses, plays hockey, engages in extreme sports, drinks in moderation if at all, attends
Russian Orthodox church services––and acknowledges beautiful Russian women, who
reciprocate by giving him their support. The Kremlin’s image-makers depict him as an updated
“Real Russian Man.” That model is dependent upon the normative gender order instilling desire
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in men to be like Putin, and for women to desire Putin. But it also seeks to subvert other modes
of being; and impose strict gender order.
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Chapter Two. Performative Policy and Political Vanity
2.1 Bedroom Politics
The function of Putin’s branding is two-fold. It works as a soft power tool to display the
sovereignty and strength of Russia, and also as a tool for intervention into private life through
mass media that beckons validation through normative male and female behavior––exacerbating
the social implications of imprudent policy. Johnson and Saarinen argue that there is a
comparison to be made between Putin’s physical appearance and his interventionism in
post-Soviet states like his annexation of Crimea in the Ukraine, the Kremlin’s cyberattacks in
Estonia, and the invasions of Georgia and Chechnya.
Johnson and Saarinen categorize Russia as a “gender regime,” a government which
evokes and furthers stratas based on gender, “from private to public, in various domains (such as
economic, political, and civil society) as well as social relations.” They define gender regimes as
95

“the constitutive structures that (re)produce gender relations.” Governmental structures, in their
case, further gender norms in society, and therein affect how society interacts.
In this tableau, Putin is cast as the protector. This image operates on the international
scale, in that the theater of operations must look stable––Russia maintains a strongman image
internally by intervening in surrounding states, and adopts an anti-civil-society rhetoric in the
media. Johnson and Saarinen cite a 2010 study by political scientist Amrita Basu which asserts
that “women’s movements are less likely to emerge when states are weak and repressive and
96

there is a chasm between official pronouncements and actual politics and practices.” Women’s
movements, as discussed in 1.2, have emerged in Russia, but they have issues with cohesion. The
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lack of an organized women’s movement is naturally beneficial to the gender regime. Without a
cohesive feminist opposition to call out the gender regime, the gender regime can maintain its
norms and stratifications without challenge.
The campaign song “Man Like Putin” offers an image of Putin as a hero, a savior, an
ideal, respectful partner. The lyrics––written by pop star Alexsandr Yelin as part of a bet––are
derived from the fact that domestic violence is deeply prevalent in Russia, without any
legislation that protects the victim from the perpetrator. The song, which became a cultural
phenomenon, considers the culture of domestic violence in Russia, and offers Putin as an
alternative to the archetypal drunk, abusive boyfriend:
A man like Putin, full of strength
A man like Putin, who won’t be a drunk
A man like Putin, who won’t hurt me
97
A man like Putin, who won’t run away
These lyrics address the prevalent issue of domestic violence passively, and even place the
responsibility for the issue of domestic violence on women themselves and their deficient
abilities to choose partners. The song suggests that women need protection from men, and that
they should put their faith in Putin’s presidency, and cast him in the role of protector––another
normative legitimation strategy. This became his campaign song.
According to a 2018 Human Rights Watch report, one in five Russian women has been,
98

or currently is being abused by her partner. Domestic violence is not legally an offense in
Russia––there is no legal language to make a distinction between domestic violence and battery.
Human Rights Watch wrote a policy recommendation in 2012 that the state adopt measures to
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protect victims of domestic violence, and make partner abuse a criminal offense. After HRW
drafted the recommendation, the organization worked with Duma officials to see that this bill
passed. The federal offices of the Interior Ministry, as well as the Ministry of Labor and Social
Protection approved it, and the Presidential Council on Human Rights formally recommended
that the Duma adopt it. But in 2016, the measure stalled. An undisclosed senior official stated
that the Duma was citing arbitrary errors, “bureaucratic pretexts, and that the committee rejected
the draft because of a powerful pushback from religious leaders and other supporters of
‘traditional values.’”
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There was, however, a brief, six-month period in 2016 in which domestic violence was
made a criminal offense, beginning in July and ending in February of 2017. This was in an effort
to “lighten the criminal justice system’s burden.”
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However, parliament fought back beginning

in November of 2016––a team of lawmakers led by Senator Mizulina argued for family
sovereignty and state sovereignty––citing danger stemming from Western NGOs:
They . . . have a very mercantile interest in promoting this agenda. The thing is, Western
countries have grant programs for NGOs that fight domestic violence. Because of this, a
lot of topics are being forcefully included in the political agenda. This applies not only to
groups that receive foreign funding. Russia has a lot of its own programs on the federal
and regional level. NGOs inflate the importance of this topic in order to increase the
overall funds allocated to fight the problem and also as part of competition for the
101
existing ones.
Mizulina subverts the problem of lax policy toward domestic violence in Russia, with the
argument that state sovereignty is under attack by Western NGOs, which seek to destabilize
Russia. Thus, the power of Putinist rhetoric is two-fold: it takes the real, domestic issue to the
global scale, and then succeeds in placating it by invoking outside threats that must be stopped.
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Mizulina’s rhetoric called for sovereignty in the country and in the home, leveraging the
Kremlin’s contentious relationships with international watchdogs against the new policy
changes. The domestic programs she cited did not provide the victim with protections, and in
certain cases victims even were legally required to pay their abusers’ battery fines. In the first
week of February 2017, parliament adopted a bill that would decriminalize domestic violence,
and the following week, Putin signed it into law, ending the brief period in Russia during which
there was substantial legal recourse to domestic violence.
Mizulina’s argument was rooted in the idea that in such a patriarchal society, domestic
violence, when it is inflicted on a woman by a male partner, is “less” offensive than other
behaviors:
Mizulina suggested that women “don’t take offense when they see a man beat his wife”
and that a man beating his wife is “less offensive” than when a woman “humiliates a
man.” She and other parliamentarians also argued, with no evidence, that criminal
sanctions for certain forms of domestic violence would disproportionately affect parents
102
who use “spanking” to discipline their children.
The HRW report did not invoke suggestive language on child discipline as part of the suggestion
to the Russian government to improve its domestic violence policies. The argument came to
centralize the role of NGOs as agents of Western “interference,” which the Kremlin cast as a
threat to Russia’s sovereignty. The HRW argument was blown out of proportion.
This is a tactic that is not only Putinist, but maintains a legacy in the history of Russian
and Soviet leadership. The real problem of lack of equality is placated by the argument that
foreign powers are out to destabilize Russia, and that internal politics are connected with external
threats of intervention––especially that of Western, human rights intervention.
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The Kremlin’s brand of state sovereignty relies upon the development of a strong sense
of nationalism: Putinism relies on manufacturing support for the claim that unity on the home
front against the rest of the world is important to the fate of Russia, and then producing the
solution to that problem in the form of a masculine figurehead. Considering the demographic
issue,103 the call on women to reproduce, the rhetoric and policy around abortion, and the lack of
effective reprimand for domestic violence, invoking nationalism and patriotism makes an
effective subversion tactic. Putin and his Kremlin allies obscure the problem and absolve
responsibility for mishandling rampant national problem of domestic violence. The responsibility
falls on the abused partner, and she is considered at fault, as the victim is blamed for putting
herself in a dangerous situation. But the backdrop of abuse also works as a part of a legitimation
strategy, which relies on the continuation of abuse to produce the image of Putin as the superior
man. This scapegoats the violent elements of manhood to the abusive men, and casts Putin as the
superior man.
Putin’s policies and rhetorical stance on NGOs attack Western intervention in a similar
way to how the West was portrayed during the height of the original Helsinki Watch Group’s
campaign to hold the Soviet Government to international standards of conduct. The “foreign
agent” law, aimed at any NGO that is politically analytical or critical, requires NGOs to register
104

as ‘foreign agents.”

This requires scrutiny of spending and earning, and requires leaders of any

group that holds the government accountable to report to officials every quarter. Memorial, an
NGO which commemorates victims of Soviet-era repression and keeps records of totalitarian
activity, was fined 600,000 roubles ($9,000 approximately) for the distribution of their materials
103
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without specifying that they were “foreign agents.” Any NGO that is angled toward
record-keeping and information sharing, that is aimed toward human rights protections, or is
critical of the government, is labeled and persecuted by the state. While all that takes on the
Kremlin’s international relations, internal politics and policies remain stagnant, abstracted by the
invocation of Western interventionism.
Johnson and Saarinen write of the effectiveness of Putinist pronatalism, that he “is using
his own brand of masculinity to embolden the national psychology and to legitimate more
105

muscular intervention into all aspects of people’s lives.”

Putin’s masculinity relies upon

establishing and asserting his sex appeal. Johnson and Saarinen write that such images put forth
106

by the Kremlin depict “a sexualized tough guy, a new real Russian man.”

Putin’s “real Russian

man” image relies upon the failure of Russian masculinity in general, and the continuation of the
domestic violence crisis. Voronina writes of the confluence of issues as private problems:
“concerning only the ‘fair sex.’ But it is precisely here that the most important mechanism for
107

the perpetuation of traditional patriarchal ideology is concealed.”

Thus, behind all of this

imagery––the shirtless Putin, the ideal man, the woman who picks a man for safety––patriarchy,
machismo, gender norms and inequalities pervade with force and call people into question for
their individual choices, and how they can better benefit the state.
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2.2 Abrasive Rhetoric, and Lacking Representation
In 2009, the head of United Russia’s political department attempted to make a point
about economic modernization. To make this point, he made the choice to use rape as metaphor:
108

“I saved a girl from being raped. I just persuaded her.”

Rhetoric is a powerful tool for public political legitimation. Putin’s wielding and
deployment of a rhetoric of masculine sovereignty has been successful for his party and his
allies, as seen in Mizulina’s statements on NGO intervention. Such rhetoric is also a tool to
influence society. Putin wielded the language traditionally associated with men in his new
rhetorical form, that “signaled new public legitimacy for what had been private, male-only locker
room talk, bringing the language of the siloviki—
 comrades from the police, military, and
intelligence agencies—into public discourse.” This has materialized, as Johnson and Saarinen
describe, in incidents like his first political crisis: “in summer 2000—when the Kursk submarine
sank with a crew inside—Putin labeled some of the sailors’ wives as whores in response to their
agitation for a government rescue operation.”

109

The language of fraternity thus became useful in

terms of shutting down dissent by posing the state and its interests in masculine terms, and
humiliating opposition in feminine terms. This para-political tactic allows the Kremlin to
leverage misogyny to make attacks on opponents, critics, and policy suggestions without the
need to engage on the opposition’s own rhetorical terms.
Voronina writes that “it has become almost improper to speak about women’s everyday
family burdens, since this motif resounds so often (albeit without results), whenever the
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discussion turns to women and ‘their’ problems.”

In the context of the masculinized political

sphere and its rhetoric, the place for women’s issues and problems is not only absent, but almost
rhetorically treated as if they aren’t a concern without a political dimension. In the backdrop of
these rhetorical standards, advocacy for women’s issues is much harder to achieve.
This is also legitimized through the political and cultural hegemony of the Russian
Orthodox Church. Within the church, there is very little space made for women’s issues. This is
emphasized through the strong enforcement of gender roles within the church, where women are
not allowed to serve within the structure of the church as priests or clerics. Historian Nadezhda
Kizenko writes that when women go to confess, and are seeking priestly advice on issues of
reproduction, non-marital sex, they are seen as comitting “a crime against pastoral conscience;
111

and they sow temptation among the other parishioners.”

The legacy of the Soviet past may appear promising on women’s representation, but
emboldens the lack of high leadership roles occupied by women. The Supreme Soviet, the
legislative body for the Soviet republics, there was a quota that ensured there would be 33%
112

female representation.

But in the higher seats, women were lacking: only two women held the
113

ministerial seats between 1923 and 1991.

In the high offices of the Politburo and Central
114

Committee, women retained 3% representation in the full duration of the Soviet era.

Women in federal power are working within a context where machismo politics have
gone unchecked. Women in the Duma are a minority: statistics from 2011 show that women then
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occupied 61 seats in the Federal Duma, while men occupied 389 seats––making the Duma 13.5%
115

per cent women.

As of 2020, women occupy 71 of 450 Duma seats. The Inter-Parliamentary

Union’s tracking of women’s representation in federal power has depicted Russia’s steady
plunging down the ranks. In a list of 189 countries, the Russian Federation ranks 133rd as of data
116

from March 2020, a significant plummet from 100th place in 2015.

Of 170 upper chamber

seats, 29 are occupied by women––making potential legislation inherently skewed and
influenced by a male majority.
Women’s issues, then, only exist to the degree that women are seen as responsible for
themselves; their reproductive health, their place in issues of domestic violence, their place in
society as a whole. Importantly, it is a confluence of “responsibility” and agency. Through the
machinery of the Putinist power model, women are held entirely responsible for domestic
violence, while the failures of the government to protect through policy are not broached.
Various movements and organizations challenge existing policy, but they are met with the
masculine derision associated with Putinist rhetoric, which demean their political demands while
also reinforcing the dominance of the male figurehead image that Putin embodies.

2.3 Policy suggestions: Do They Matter?
The Kremlin has not integrated any policy suggestions generated by NGOs, i.e, the
suggestions of Human Rights Watch in terms of domestic violence policy. These policy
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suggestions have effectively been neutralized by casting them as extensions of Western
intervention into Russia’s sovereignty.
There have been experiments and attempts to ameliorate the system on the local level: an
internationally–implemented policy suggestion, “participatory gender budgeting,” is a tactic
117

employed by over 70 countries worldwide as of 2014, and was attempted in Russia as the
Gender Development Strategy of the Russian Federation. International donors supported this
process in conjunction with the Open Society Institute––hoping to put forth a playbook for
gender equality in Russia within the systems and infrastructure of Russian bureaucracy. The pilot
test for the program was undertaken in the Komi Republic of Russia, however, it was inevitably
abandoned by the Putin regime. Research on the St. Petersburg state budget showed it “was not
oriented practically to taking up gender issues,”

118

a claim which appears dubious in the general

tableau of the Putin-led government.
This is part of a larger debate on community needs and budgeting. Gender Studies
scholar Venera Zakirova explains that local officials are “hesitant to or afraid of encouraging
citizen participation, as they believe it will lead to demand for more services and place additional
119

burdens on already scarce resources.”

This, then, becomes a civil society issue, with the

government deciding social services without consulting and surveying the regions and people
whom they serve: “Delivery of services by the municipalities and other government agencies still
does not take account of people’s opinions or include consultations with civil society
organizations.” The victims, Zakirova deduces, are primarily women, children, and the elderly,
as well as large families. Zakirova cites the “top-down” approach of governance as the crux of
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this issue, as it leaves officials vulnerable to the orders of the Kremlin. Both cities and provinces
are affected by deprivation of resources, but provinces have especially limited government
resources. There is “limited access to health care, schools, day care centres for small children,
hospitals or maternity clinics, let alone good roads or well-developed public transport.” Above
two thirds of provincial households live below or at the cusp of poverty. These numbers, as of
120

2018, estimate that 19.3 billion (one fifth of the population) live at or below the poverty line

––9,786 roubles, which as of 2020 is $142.74. The tacit refusal of the Duma to entertain certain
policy suggestions, even when tested on the local governmental level and accepted, are not
accepted on the larger playing field of Russian politics, and then curbed altogether.
In terms of furthering reproductive policy through lobbying, anthropologist Michele
Rivkin-Fish writes of reproductive legislation amid Russia’s demographic crisis, positing that
any such lobbying for women’s reproductive rights is dangerous “amid Russia’s aggressively
nationalist demographic politics.”

121

The Kremlin offers, again, no room for suggestions. The

landscape of reproductive legislation is controlled by men, while Mizulina serves as the face of
the anti-abortion brigade symbolically.

There was, at one point, something called “maternity capital,” wherein women with new
infants in families with more than one child were given vouchers in order to ease child rearing
expenses. These vouchers amount to $10,000. However, this is again a placation of larger issues
of the state, such as lack of fundamental state resources and programs. This does not affect the
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quality of childcare, nor has it furthered the idea that men are contributors to domestic labor.
These vouchers are a strategic distraction:
Instead, it has encouraged women to exit the workforce as a solution to the presumed
barriers impeding women from bearing second and third children. Thus, despite Putin’s
framing of this entitlement as promoting women’s needs, maternity capital ties the state’s
support for families closely to its own pronatalist goals, further entrenching a vision of
122
women as mothers and linking them to the domestic sphere.
The vouchers, ultimately, seek to return women to the home. In the debates on the demographic
crisis, there is a line of thought of such maternity policies as stoking a masculinity crisis and
rendering men useless. Male humiliation based on lack of finances and small salaries operates as
a crux of the argument against maternity capital, that “a long-standing crisis of masculinity
stands at the root of Russia’s family crisis, including low fertility.”

123

Internal policy suggestions are more of the same pronatalist approaches to abortion. The
demographic crisis made these internal policies exceptionally vicious. A 2011 draft legislation,
put forth by Parliamentarian V.G. Dragonov, would have required women to recieve letters of
permission from husbands (and underage pregnant women parental permission) to recieve
abortions. This would also entail a 7-day wait period, “a mandatory ultrasound in which a
woman was to see and hear the fetus’s beating heart,” and “a counseling session informing
women about the harms of abortion and her “right to refuse” an abortion.”
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The language of

this bill also entailed the elimination of any social needs for abortion except for a rape-induced
pregnancy. Rivkin-Fish posits that “with ongoing support from the Orthodox Church and global
antiabortion movements, further restrictions may emerge.” The Orthodox Church has a hardline
stance on abortion and, even, miscarriage. Priests have women who are looking for absolution
122
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for the sin of abortion to do the prayer for miscarriage, laying the blame on them: “for women
who have actually miscarried, this prayer, which essentially blames them for their child’s death
and bars them from the Eucharist, is more devastating than the penalties for abortion itself.” The
125

penalty of abortion, in Orthodox doctrine, is the excommunication of the subject for ten years.

Federal policies work in conjunction with the Russian Orthodox Church, and the concept
of the patriarchy is taken on “more literally in Russia than it does in other Christian religious
126

traditions.”

The Church, at the same time, furthers image of the ideal Russian man––a pious

man of relative sobriety. But “there was neither a context nor an audience for discussing a
greater role for women.”

127

The image of women within the Church is mainly of pious,

conservative older women.
Policies, then, work to please the beneficiaries of the Putin regime, with the furthering of
bills––some which claim to be helping women, like the maternity capital bill––that seek to keep
women in the domestic sphere. But the reality is that women are left out of the policy through
sinister means. This is a resort to living on welfare, and being dependent on the state.

2.4 Averting Attention: “I’m a Girl, I Don’t Want to Hear About Politics”
State politics, though maintaining the performative appearance of inclusion, are
notoriously a no-woman’s-land. This is both in the makeup of the Duma128 and in its policies.
Voronina posits that
women as a social group are, for all intents and purposes, alienated from politics, insofar
as they are considered to have no particular political or social interest which differs from
the interests of men, and, on the other hand, the latter are convinced that politics is
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definitely not a women’s affair. Thus, it is more a case of suppression of the interests of
129
women than of their over-emancipation.
This is emphasized through commercial means. In the spring of 2013, a television station called
“You” (a play on the Russian letter Ю) materialized, a channel for women, with advertisements
featuring CGI cats with wigs of human hair and feminine outfits. One such advertisement read,
130

“I am a girl [devushka]. I don’t want [to hear about] politics. I want a channel that’s for me.”

The implication was the marketing message––that Russian girls and women are not needed in the
political sphere, they can return to their shows. Similar ads by You ran about girls not being
interested in watching sports.
This sort of allowance within the marketplace, making such gender disparity visible, is
deeply telling. While independent news media takes to the internet,131 the space is made for
channel You on television.
The degradation of women in the media and in mass culture and the discrimination in all
spheres of life, remains not only unpunished, for all intents and purposes, but is not even
recognized by a society that is trying to become democratic. An orientation toward
changing the position of women is nowhere written into the humanistic and democratic
program for the transformation of society, because the myth of the emancipation of
132
women under socialism is too deeply rooted in the social and individual consciousness.
The market and the media help to show women in their places nonchalantly, and sew political
consciousness in society. Marketing of Kremlin-aligned channels geared toward women makes it
hard to legitimize women in the spheres of politics and dissent, and distracts from major policy
needs.

129

Voronina, “Soviet Patriarchy,” 100.
Sperling, Sex, Politics, and Putin, 309.
131
This is further discussed in 3.4 and the conclusion.
132
Voronina, “Soviet Patriarchy,” 101.
130

Goldberg 56

Additionally, gender-based marketing in this context is a distraction from the lack of
resources allocated to the funding of gender issues, and the high level of disorganization in
kleptocracy. “You” was created through psychologically persuasive means, utilizing focus
groups of women and what they would like to see on television. This taps into the political
consciousness that has been sewn, and exploits the current state of gender politics in Russia to
market and monetize the lack of inclusion.
Such a political consciousness has created the space for the prevalence of sexism in
politics, the giving of birthday calendars of pin-ups to the leader of the country, the lack of any
policy change in terms of addressing gender inequality, the lack of federal funding for families,
and the state-sponsored directives to procreate. And in this space, with unitary power, the status
quo is maintained and proliferated through the media. The takeaway of this, then, is that women
are cast in submissive roles, either overtly or through the psychology of entrenchment in
male-controlled societies, which is emboldened by the lack of their representation in the Duma.
In her influential book, Sex, Politics, and Putin, Sperling outlines the discrimination in
parliament, and the roles of women within it. If discrimination was invisible to the Duma
women, “it had not remained so to Russia’s feminist activists, who saw it as pervasive in the
spheres of political, economic, social, and personal life.”

133

Putinist politics on the Duma floor

operated with such legitimation strategies, Sperling writes:
Political legitimation strategies that rely on gender norms include ‘topping,’ or asserting
masculine dominance over other men, enhancing political authority by claiming the
sexual allegiance of attractive, feminine women, and undermining opponents’ positions
by attacking their masculinity or femininity as deviant. These techniques only work
effectively in a cultural-political context where sexism and homophobia are widely
134
accepted or at least a little questioned in public.
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Even though women working in the context of the Russian Duma are “in power,” they are
working within these contexts which ascribe a dominance and pecking order, with an uneven
gender balance. Many of the policies adopted in the Duma directly affect women––and are
stamped by women in performative roles of Putinist allyship.
The scholar Deniz Kandiyoti offers analysis of this phenomenon in her work, Bargaining
with the Patriarchy:
women in areas of classic patriarchy often adhere as long as they possibly can to rules
that result in the unfailing devaluation of their labor. The cyclical fluctuations of their
power position, combined with status considerations, result in their active collusion with
the reproduction of their own subordination. They would rather adopt interpersonal
strategies to maximize their security through manipulation of the affections of their sons
135
and husband.
Is docility within state power, then, a maximization of security? Certainly those working
alongside Putin must be docile in their intentions, and ambitious to garner power through their
associations with him and his Kremlin allies. Women who aligned themselves with Putin, then,
“through their actions to resist passivity and total male control, became participants with vested
interests in the system that oppressed them.”

136

There is a material base to state power held by

men; there is no such similar experience for women. These considerations of gender power
imbalance are deeply rooted, and increased, in the Putinist period.
Thus, Kandiyoti’s theory is applicable to the picture of Russian gender imbalance today.
She argues, in her example of certain sub-saharan African societies adopting democracy, that
“women often resist the process of transition because they see the old normative order slipping
137

away from them without empowering alternatives.”

This is also an explanation for the absence
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of a cohesive and successful women’s movement during the perestroika period and the “time of
troubles” under Yeltsin. People were struggling to locate themselves after years of perceived
Soviet equality and a social welfare system. Intense branding, marketed to a people that has one
through traumatic regime change, has created political opportunism: it becomes a game of
loyalties, and a gaming of stability.
Benefits to ideological docility within the power structure of Duma run with the fabric of
patriarchal bargaining: Mizulina, for example, gains reliability and reputation through being in
step with Putinist policy of the moment––it is a strategic, if not outright blatantly opportunistic
move. This opportunism has been expressed through how Mizulina started out: as a fairly
progressive senator who opposed war with Chechnya. The Russian politician Boris Nadezhdin
said to Open Democracy that “over the years she went with the flow, from Gaidar to Putin. She
wasn’t the only one, and she feels good about it. She has connections among the ‘strongmen’
138

surrounding Putin, and all this heady brew of Imperial Orthodoxy probably came from them.”

In Kandiyoti’s terms, Mizulina’s steps are strategic moves in a system that is only in the recent
past adopting an illusion of stability. The benefit to docility is job stability.
When asking the question of why women would forward policies that do not benefit
major issues that are associated exclusively with their wellbeing: such as access to reproductive
health centers, equitable pay, and other questions of equitable standing in society, one can look
to this quote from Kandiyoti: “Patriarchal bargains do no merely inform women’s rational
choices but also shape the more unconscious aspects of their gendered subjectivity, since they
139

permeate the context of their early socialization, as well as their adult cultural milieu.”
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Short-term, material interests like social standing and salary take precedence. Kandiyoti
writes of the presence of passivity within these contexts: “their passive resistance takes the form
of claiming their half of this particular patriarchal bargain––protection in exchange for
140

submissiveness and propriety.”

Protection is granted by docility.

Margarita Simonyan is another case study in ideological docillity: the editor-in-chief of
Russia Today, a state news outlet often described as a “soft-power tool” which was designed to
improve Russia’s image abroad, also directly benefits from the Putinist structure. Simonyan was
ranked No. 5 on the Forbes 2017 Power Women: Most Powerful Women in
141

Media/Entertainment, r ight next to popstar Beyoncé Knowles.

Journalist Julia Ioffe writes of the docility required to work within the context of the
Kremlin news pool: “To be picked for the Kremlin press pool is an honor but also a sign of
trustworthiness. The pool is a place for the most loyal of the loyalists.” This business required
lenient morals and ideologies: “To be assigned to cover the Russian president, especially for
television, a reporter has to be absolutely reliable in his docility, and in his ability to ask softball
142

questions.”

The RT slant is deeply pro-Putin, and evokes a clever human rights rhetoric to

qualify the slant in the eye of foreign news. One article discusses the popular movement to
change heteronormative family terminology, and Putin’s mock of the movement: “While
Western ‘human rights’ groups may be girding their loins to condemn Putin’s remarks as yet
another example of ‘oppression’ in Russia, they should hold their horses before cashing those
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lobbying checks….”

Again, to make up for the lack of gender equality and even rhetorical

equality, state-affiliated leaders tout Russian sovereignty and call out the West for hyperbolizing
oppression and inequality. The RT article continues, ‘That would complicate the virtue-signaling
morality plays that pay their bills, though, so we shouldn’t hold our breath.” Again arises the
problem of placating within modern Putinist conservatism, with the means of the media and its
capacity to incite fear-based opinion and gender anxiety.
Ultimately, this media serves as an avenue for diverting attention from the real, domestic
needs at hand. The Kremlin manufactures political power through a theater of external threats
and Putinist solutions. Inclusion and insistence that women are in fact represented does little to
hide the overt statistics referenced above. The longitudinal data shows the strong decrease in
women’s standing in Putin’s power sphere, both locally and federally. The uneven Duma, then,
is tasked with womens’ public health and economic issues with women only being
approximately 16% holding seats in the legislature and 17% in higher chambers.
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Chapter Three: Political Consciousness
3.1 Commercializing Gender
Women’s leverage in the labor market requires tradeoffs that provide for upward
mobility; often entrepreneurship means tapping into male desires. The lack of representation in
145

entrepreneurial avenues results in a lack of representation in the political sphere.

In

Kandiyoti’s terms, in the context of her patriarchal bargaining argument, there is a tradeoff in
marrying rich in a gender regime with a major wealth gap. This is the background for the popular
phenomenon of gold-digging, and becoming a mistress to wealthy men. This is best outlined
anecdotally in TV producer Peter Pomerantsev’s book, Nothing is True and Everything is
Possible, w
 here he recalls producing a reality show called “Gold Digging Academy” for the
Russian TV channel “TNT.”
The Gold Digging Academy is one of dozens of these schools in Moscow. One such
school is the Geisha School, with classes with year-and-a-half wait lists for classes like “How to
Marry in Three Months,” “Oral Sex for Experts,” and “How to Be Your Man’s Number One
146

Lover.”

This all highlights that husband-finding is a competition, and because of the

demographic problem, there are many women to one man. Yulia Varra, the instructor at the
Moscow Geisha school, said to Marie Claire Magazine, “Relationships are like roulette for
modern Russian women. They have a lot to win and everything to lose, so they can never afford
to get complacent.” Some women bring their daughters. Self-help classes and books, by no
surprise, generate a profit from telling women how to marry rich––rather than become rich
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themselves. But even some of the women training women to be desirable are unwed: building
profitable businesses in teaching traits of desirability.
The popularity of misstressdom and schools where women are taught to land oligarchs
are not only a pop-culture phenomenon, but a product of political consciousness. This is a way
out, and a tradeoff: many of these women are from poor families from the provinces, coming to
147

Moscow in order to lead a different life.

Many of these women did not have father figures (a

universal trope, but problematized by the connotations associated with Russian manhood), and
seek male protection. Pomerantsev writes that the gold diggers he met were fatherless, and the
fantasies of finding a “sugar daddy” were intertwined with the fantasy of having a father figure.
Putin is wrapped up in this example: “All the shirtless photos hunting tigers and harpooning
whales are love letters to the endless queues of fatherless girls. The President as the ultimate
148

sugar daddy, the ultimate protector with whom you can be as ‘behind a stone wall.’”

This is one of many explanations; others are the persistent demographic problem in
Russia, the extreme wealth gap that generates disparity and joblessness, the life expectancy of
males, and foremost the lack of political conversation and policy about anything beyond the
traditional marriage and gender identity. Another issue is the added, unspoken requirements for
women in their fields. Pomeranstev describes the job of translating as a microcosmic example,
citing that a specific unnamed translation agency looks for women with “no complexes,”
meaning “code for being prepared to bed the client.”
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Sperling references a similar brand of“for

hire” ads in newspapers in her 1999 book, Organizing Women in Contemporary Russia,
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willing to put up with sexual demands by bosses… an institutionalized form of sexual
150

harassement.”

In the case of the TNT show, there is notorious “matchmaking” with oligarchs, organized
by Peter Listerman, a self-proclaimed “matchmaker,” but considered a pimp and associated with
the Jeffrey Epstein sex-trafficking and molestation scandal. He had found teen girls for Epstein,
and had sent text messages to a 14-year-old model, saying “Hey, Bride-to-be, have you been
successful?” Listerman is quoted in the tabloid Komsomolskaya Pravda saying, “My Holywood
clients and oligarchs are sick of emancipated… women, who resemble robots. Everybody is sick
151

of these evil women, they want gentle and romantic!”

Another popular TV show was called “Insanely Beautiful,” a game show in which young,
attractive women are asked trivia and logic questions, and men attempt to guess what the women
152

would answer.

The introducer, a woman herself, provided that because the women were

beautiful, it complicated their ability to logically answer the questions provided to them.
The playing field of image-making is inherently skewed by the state-controlled media.
This serves as one of the many examples of how lack of policy fails a culture in its efforts to
reduce its problems, and then seeks to ridicule the groups and internalize gender norms. This
does not generate a result to the demographic problem, nor any of the pronatalist policies for
women in Russia. Women’s upward mobility is considered as reliant on male power. Image
holds ground: the wealthy male, and the female who imagines herself rising to luxury, and
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therefore safety are responses to past instability. Such images are projected and validated through
media, in books, and through culture more generally.
Even Ksenia Sobchak, an oppositionist presidential candidate in 2018, reality show host,
blogger and critic of the Kremlin and its media, published her own book on marrying rich, called
153

“How to Marry a Millionaire, or Marriage of a Higher Sort.”

This book, co-written with

socialite Oksana Robsky, is another one of the how-to guides on marrying rich. It is even from
the oppositionists like Sobchak that such content is produced.
These tradeoffs make the Putinist legitimation system work: both as Putin’s masculinist,
pronatalist legitimation system but also as the mechanism for instilling political consciousness.
Therefore, lack of coherent policy is not a concern of the government. All may continue as such,
and is not seen as a problem. The sexualized Putinist pin-ups and the Orthodox Church have
their differences, but they all play the same game of validation in the Kremlin power machine.

3.2 Monetizing Inferiority
As previously discussed, the economic realities of modern Russia have given way to a
centralization of money in its “controlled democracy.” The system of beliefs in modern Russia
includes faith in opportunity, which holds that money-making is a realistic prospect that is within
one’s reach. While this can be true, economic mobility is nearly impossible in a wealth landscape
where most of the population is living at or below the poverty line.154 However, mechanisms of
wealth-gleaning in Russia are associated with the state, and general political opportunism.
Though there are many considerably wealthy actors in Russia who are “apolitical” or faintly
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criticize the system and its leaders, those that do cash out the most are those that align
themselves with Putinist leadership.
The dream of Russian wealth is the dream of opulence, success, and freedoms, which is
why so many of the sites in which women seeking wealthy men (and purportedly wealthy men
seeking women) find themselves geographically closer to the Kremlin.
Fabricating propaganda is a maneuver to benefit from government money. Consider
Krymski Most (in English, “Bridge to Crimea. Made With Love!”), a film written by Simonyan.
The film tells the tale of a romance between a daring bridge-builder and a beautiful young
archaeologist––while at the same time operating as state propaganda promoting the controversial
bridge, which happens to be the sum of Putin’s annexation.155 The oppositionist Alexei Navalny
and his team led an investigation into the allocation of funds for the film, and payments, finding
that Simoyan went to Alexei Gromov, Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration, who
156

pushed the Ministry of Culture to provide taxpayer money in order to make the movie.

Both

Gromov and Simonyan are paid in taxpayer money in their day jobs. The movie cost 100 million
roubles to shoot (1.34 million USD). Included, Simoyan was paid 9 million roubles for the script
of Bridge to Crimea directly to her personal account from the Cinema Foundation.
Thus, learning how to game the system is learning how to survive in an oligarchical
economy. The same way in which the Kremlin employs its image-making machine to make
Putin a brand that people want to subscribe to, the wealthy employ similar tactics, or even align
themselves with already-present images in the system. In the case of the Kremlin’s women,
Mizulina brands herself (though coming from a progressive past, advocating for women’s
See 2.4 for reference on Simonyan.
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reproductive rights in the Yeltsin years) as a staunch conservative to a dramatic extent––having
constructed a graveyard for aborted fetuses.
Thus, good behavior that aligns with the political moment is the way to survive in Russia,
and performance generates revenue. Women––whether fully convinced by Putin or just trying to
get by––are aware of this and are able to position themselves to game the system as per rules.
Though this phenomenon is universal, it holds cultural weight with the performance of Soviet
and post-Soviet citizenship in Russia.

3.3 Are Russia’s Female Citizens Passive?
The political history of women in Russia does not cast them in a passive role, so to call
them passive in Russia’s contemporary society is simply not enough of an explanation to make
sense of why progressive gender policy stagnates. Kandiyoti’s theory, that women are not
passive political actors, but rather they locate themselves in short-term positions of safety in
patriarchal societies, is key to understanding women’s roles in contemporary Russia. Passivity is
performance. It is an active choice to participate in one of the gold-digging schools, but is of
course no locus for change.
The concept of “women’s roles” in Russia has been constantly in flux––from being
locked in monasteries during the Rurik dynasty to the reforms of the reign of Peter the Great,
from the Tsarinas157 to Marxist women of the People’s Will who succeeded in toppling the entire
status quo. Women’s roles have fluctuated throughout the history of the Soviet Union: women
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were promised equality, and their efforts were truncated by the rise of Stalin, overtly returned to
pronatalist values, all the while being touted as emancipated women.
In the peasantry, there was a saying, “Muzh zhene otets, zhena muzhu venets, ” meaning
158

“A husband is the wife’s father, a wife is the husband’s crowning glory.”

The overarching

expectation of women and children was obedience to men, often met with the repercussion of
violence in the home. The “slave soul” of Russia pertained to women in the household,
emphasizing the entrenchment of the values which pervade in Russian culture and suggest that
the woman is at the will of her father and husband. But all the while, there was no passivity;
there was, rather, careful bargaining for stable roles in society. This is why political opportunism
is unsurprising, but also provides a possible explanation for why social movements are perceived
as axiomatic.
In a society that is ever-changing, and perceived as generally unstable, with a weak leader
that is touted as a strongman, where poverty is astounding but opulence is the image that
surrounds the Kremlin, people seek out that opulence for themselves in order to achieve
proximity to power and an image of themselves as successful. The story of finding stable roles is
eternal––opulence applies to the human mentality, but also the cultural longing for stability after
the traumas of regime change. Images of Russian power that proliferate in the media are that of
extreme, oligarchical opulence, which signals safety.
While there is a legacy of women choosing stable positions in a generally unstable
society, there parallels a legacy of performativity toward womens’ issues. The societal
expectations of women fulfilling certain roles are entrenched; examples of this are the
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Brezhnev-era jokes about women feeling overworked with their double burden of labording and
taking care of their families. These expectations from the selective, brand-based Kremlin, are
ideas of women that are congruent with the likes of leaders that place women in certain roles. Per
Connell and Messerschmidt (see 1.5), a leading minority can appear as a majority.
It is not that Putin is more lax on the home front: it is that the fabric of this kind of
repression is more ambiguous. Modern authoritarianism in Russia is vastly repressive,
militaristic, and expansionist. This kind of authoritarianism does not hold its own overt ideology.
Rather, it is amorphous, and this lack of shape is precisely what lends it the appearance of
impenetrability. Its ideology is simultaneously everywhere and nowhere. The historian Walter
Lacquer writes, “there are periods in history in which the absence of a doctrine or belief system
159

can be tolerated, at least temporarily, whereas during others it will be unthinkable.”

But as

time goes on with the same leadership, “a process of routinization sets in, in which the demand
for change becomes intense and frequent.” This is similar to what Russia has been seeing with
the massive protests in major Russian cities, demanding fair elections, and the work of activists
nationwide.
United Russia, the now-dissolved party which propped up Putin, had a manifesto, written
in 2003, that carried language with no overt meaning or goals. It had no ideology, but rather
language that suggested a binary between the party and the current state of affairs when it was
written: “Democracy or authoritarianism? The market or regulation? Openness or closure of the
country?” and continued “Decisive political language and aims should be focused on real
problems… We plan to become the party of Russian national success… We believe in ourselves
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and in Russia!”

There was no real party ideology, but there was money and bureaucrats that

could prop up the party: “It was a party of bureaucrats, conformists, and opportunists,” writes
Andrew Jack in his book, Inside Putin’s Russia. “Even those advising it seemed cynical about
161

the whole exercise.”

Putin dissolved his cabinet in 2020, and appointed Mikhail Mishustin––the former head
of Russia’s federal tax service––as his prime minister, with unanimous approval by United
Russia. The constitutional changes that were cited as the reason for this move would further
centralize Putin’s power and ability to stay in power.162 Overall, the party was weak, and now the
power is further centralized, and machismo remains in the seats of high office, while gender
policy stagnates.
But this is all a product of the Putin package. On the outside, he is losing his base. As of
April 23, 2020, Putin’s popularity is at an all time low in the past six years. According to a poll
163

by the Levada Center, Putin’s approval rating is at 63%.

This is a large drop from his 83%

approval after the annexation of Crimea. The Levada Center also ran a survey from March
19-25, 2020, asking people about their opinions of the Russian political system, asking if the
center of power should remain as it is or if there ought to be new people in power, and most
164

chose the latter.

The response to the publication of these statistics was controversy over their

even being published. Vedomosti,a Russian paper, produced infighting when journalist Ksenia
Boltskaya published the study by the Levada Center, and the new Editor-in-Chief Andrei
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Shmarov deleted it. Boltskaya used the app Telegram to alert people and receive outside media
165

attention on this matter.

The Moscow Times reported that Shmarov “banned articles that cite

surveys from Russia’s last remaining polling agency… claiming that the orders came from the
166

Kremlin.”

At the time of this writing, the Kremlin is seeking to gather control of these new statistics
while the country and its markets grapple with the effects of the novel coronavirus pandemic.
Revenue in the Russian Federation is down 90%, and a petition for aid, launched on March 24, to
small businesses has resulted in 347,177 signatures and counting.
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The original package for

April and May was to be a stimulus equating to only $160 per person. Time magazine reported
that a protest broke out in the southern Vladikavkaz region of 2,000 people, angry “over job
168

losses and a lack of clear information.”

Putin and his administration were unprepared in facing

the pandemic, according to the Time r eport. The situation has his political popularity very low as
he takes refuge in his country home. His past crowning achievements are now rendered
unimportant, and Putin, as of April 27, has only appeared on television four times to address the
public. As of April 27, Russia has ranked 9th most affected by the pandemic, surpassing China in
cases and deaths.
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As economic and public health instability ravages Russian citizens, gender imbalance
becomes further exacerbated. With upward mobility already difficult to achieve in Russia’s
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economic system, women face an extreme challenge to place themselves in this exceptionally
tumultuous political moment. With the legacy of the economic challenges during perestroika and
the Yeltsin-era reforms that exacerbated rampant nationwide poverty, women, again, are placed
in a transitional position which tasks them to seek meager relief packages. This all harks back to
the periods from which Putin’s supporters sought refuge from, finding illusory safety in their
leader’s strong-man image.

3.4 Alternative Masculinities
To talk about these phenomena without addressing the very key element of social change
is a miss. Or, at least, the importance of youth culture. Younger and millenial Russians have seen
regime change and Putinism, and are not swayed by the same longing for stability as their elders.
The crux for change lies, in my belief, in the hands of the people who are at the forefront of
change in Russia in activism that holds the state, the Orthodox Church, and the oligarchy
accountable.
The similarities between informal social action groups in contemporary Russia and the
dissidents of the Brezhnev and Krushchev eras are vast. Generational sociologist Hillary
Pilkington writes that “where gender is brought into the youth debate at all at this abstract level,
it is in order to give an added moral dimension to the symbolic role youth plays for society in
170

general.”

Consider Eric Bronza, a St. Petersburg based artist who makes art that challenges the
state. He told me that with the given repercussions the government has taken against past
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dissident groups, such groups have been hesitant to come to the fore as an entity. But Bronza
practices acts of dissent to what he calls the “beautification” of things––the constant industrial
improvements being made by the government, often in conjunction with the wealthy contractors
working with the city. Bronza’s exhibits and performances, most notably “Nobody Loves Russia
More Than Me,” features a live performance of him in a bathtub, surrounded by dirt, and him
ultimately covering himself in the dirt.171 Bronza tells me that because of the way in which the

government has chased out certain dissident art groups, such as Pussy Riot and Art Group Voina
(meaning War), like groups are afraid to come to the fore: “There is basically no action, people
are afraid to sit in jail.” But this is not to say people are doing nothing. He tells me, “I decided to
revise these traditions in a light form,” doing street graffiti, painting a coat with the words
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“Putin, Go Away” under a spray-painted Russian flag and walking through the metro, and
holding the “Nobody Loves Russia More Than Me” exhibit.
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This is to say that dissent under the repressive state is not gone even though groups are
persecuted by the state. Dissent takes another form, rooted inside the individual; not unlike the
beginnings of the Helsinki Watch Groups in the late Soviet era. Except the contemporary toolbox
contains the internet, the limited power of organizing and self-publishing, and relative
accessibility of international attention––something that the dissidents, smuggling samizdat with
the statistics of political prisoners did not have in their disposal to find other like-thinking
people. The abilities of people to convey their needs through the internet are something that the
dissidents could not have imagined. The scope of dissent now is much larger; but is dependent
on the mobilization of opposition.

3.5 A Playbook for Change
Is the status quo unshakable? Or is there a pathway to changing it? Putin’s administration
has been stagnantly in power for twenty years, and there is no cohesive movement except the
informal organizations that have been advocating for change on the ground level, sparking
protests.
First, grassroots movements are, and will continue to be, the most important nexus for
change in the fight for change in today’s Russia. Dissident movements start out small, as
historians know from the Helsinki Watch Group, even under the repressive Brezhnev era.
Bronza, saying that though people do not seem to be gathering in oppositionist art groups
anymore, illustrates that there is hope in individual acts such as lone protesters holding placards

172

Eric Bronza, Facebook message to author, April 4, 2020.

Goldberg 74

of political prisoners in parks, artists that tell a story about their experience of Russia through a
critical lens. Bronza puts this to action himself, with graffiti and exhibits that challenge the
status-quo of Putin’s Russia. Though people are scared to speak out, does not mean they will not.
Second, the independent media, though heavily repressed and challenged by means
diffused by the government, will be key in those understanding their own dissent. The Navalny
YouTube Channel develops well-produced media with evidence on all kinds of Kremlin
corruption, thoroughly researched and explained clearly. As of 2020, Navalny’s YouTube
channel has 3.4 million followers, with video views ranging from 2 million to 6 million on
173

average.

Ksenia Sobchak––the author of How to Marry a Millionaire, s ee 3.2––also has her

own popular internet following, though her internet brand is not solely focused on oppositionist
politics, rather bringing various people in for interviews in order to deliver a wide range of
media––famously with RT Simonyan walking out of her interview when challenged on her role
as a propagandist. Sobchak has 1.4 million subscribers, and her videos range from 1 million to 6
million views. Media like theirs is key in mobilizing social movements; which they have. Both
Navalny and Sobchak ran their own presidential campaigns in 2018. Navalny was detained by
174

authorities

at an anti-Putin protest of 2,000 people. Satellite protests happened nationwide on

the same day, as is now a trend with oppositionist protests. The internet media serves as a tool
for inspiring and gathering civil society, while state media seeks to spin the facts. Additionally,
this proliferates role models beyond Putin and the images that surround his party. Navalny and
Sobchak both have their own carefully crafted brands.

Alexei Navalny, YouTube page. https://www.YouTube.com/user/NavalnyRu/featured
Marc Bennetts, “Alexei Navalny detained at anti-Putin protest in Moscow,” The Guardian, January 29, 2018.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/28/russian-police-raid-alexi-navalnys-office-on-day-of-anti-putin-ralli
es
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Third, the goals of participatory gender budgeting––experimented on local levels of
government but met with by officials with ambivalence175––can be met through active
engagement of those values on the corporate level, especially in corporations with female CEOs.
Though it has tried and failed at the public government level from disorderly offices,176 there is
no reason––beyond entrenched notions of why it cannot proliferate in the private, corporate
level.
Finally, I suggest that there is an inroad through performance. This is the approach to
combating Putinism through the performance of compliance. This is what was done, initially, in
the formation of the Helsinki Watch Group as an uninvited group of assistance to the Soviet
Union. As Putin’s fight with NGOs in Russia seeks out institutions that wish to hold Putinism
accountable, there is a final possibility that small groups can form which define themselves as
assistance groups to the implementation of laws but are in fact operations which are meant to
confront the cult of Putinism through the means of independent media, grassroots organizing,
and public oversight. Taking the constitution, the laws, and international human rights
agreements, and insisting on their proper implementation is a way to hold Putinism accountable
even in its most egregious manifestations. This would be the appropriate lesson from the human
rights movement.
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Discussed in 2.3.
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Conclusion
The current era––in which people who do not fit into the Putinist mold are excluded and
persecuted; in which the government holds families sovereign but seeks their compliance with
faulty policy, social norms, and calls to procreate; in which interventionism takes on a domestic
meaning––has its own grim effect on political representation and consciousness. The Kremlin
seeks to curb social movements and notions of civil society beyond the state. In my interview
with perestroika feminist Valentina Konstantinova, she illustrated this phenomenon;
The trouble with the women's movement, and probably the democratic movement, is that
there is no continuity. There is no continuity of tradition. It is clear that there are reasons
for this caused by totalitarian structures and totalitarian consciousness before perestroika.
Have women become more active in politics? I think that in official politics, at the
177
decision-making level, no. But they are active in informal groups and movements.
Konstantinova explains that rather than civil society being a constitutional given, discontent with
the government breeds civil society. The fight has always been grassroots: in the past, small
movements organized around specific issues, and larger movements organized around discontent
over the larger issue of authoritarianism after being propelled forth by these small movements.
This legacy continues today, and change generates from the grassroots level, while the Kremlin
seeks to mitigate civil society.
In the course of my research, I examined the papers of a well-known dissident and human
rights activist, Elena Bonner, which are preserved at Harvard University’s Houghton Library
Archive, and belong to the time of the Soviest dissident movement of the 1970s. Bonner’s
archive contained small cards with names of political prisoners and their addresses.178 These
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University Archive, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA.
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were to be smuggled across borders for the cause of publicizing names and holding the Soviet
government accountable; attempting to halt the repressive punishment systems for dissenting
thinkers and their relatives. Generating change came from small efforts like the listing and
smuggling of names across borders––names of dissidents such as Dr. Sergei Kovalyov and
geologist-turned-dissident Malva Landa.
Here is where the efforts of the dissidents and today’s oppositionists parallel: the power
of self-publishing. Samizdat, the term for self-published, individually distributed writings and
information holds weight even in today’s Russia. This is what Navalny and other independent
media wielders achieve; generating audiences in the millions. All the while, they expose
government corruption and mobilize thousands to protest their own dissatisfaction––the internet
becomes a powerful tool for the opposition.
This is why the dissident movement of the 70s is relevant to this discussion. Putinism has
been in place, and seeks to remain in place, yet many are dissatisfied––and organize be it in
protests both sanctioned and not sanctioned. But the protests of the 70s were those of small
groups––numbers now estimate in the thousands. The Levada Center study and the
Inter-Parliamentary Union data179 show discontent––which is why Putin’s regime seeks to
suppress the publication of any data indicating discontent in the media. These numbers are a
depiction of truth: people are tired of Putin’s governance.
But where there is a landscape for truth there is a looming reality. The current freedom of
the internet, though powerful, may be temporary. The Kremlin has been strategically putting
together regulations which would give the government autonomy to disconnect Russia’s
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population from the global internet––meaning, websites which connect people internationally
would no longer be accessible, and the Kremlin could access encrypted conversations, as well as
citizens’ personal data.
181

sphere.
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The Kremlin seeks to ‘localize’ data, to keep it from the international

This would be a blow to the international transparency generated by the power of the

global internet.
Mechanisms for change, however, have been crafted without the internet in the past and
can, again, achieve their goals and mobilize actors through other means. As Konstantinova
noted, informal groups and movements exist––be it under the controversial title of NGO or
not––that generate change on various levels within the administration.
All the while, the Kremlin advertises ideas which advocate one’s political monogamy
through the infusion of gender norms into the political conversation, deploying ideas of how to
be. Moscow, like any center of power, locates its’ sycophants and directs its’ power-holders
around the Kremlin. Within that center of unitary power, the conversation about gender is
one-sided, coming from an administration that seeks to convey strict gender norms and sexualize
womens’ support; of monogamous political loyalty.
Gender-normative discourse reinforces discrimination––and is a tool to alienate political
pluralism, as it reinforces its’ in-groups and out-groups. The somewhat stale Putin brand
continues; but brand-builders outside of the state models harness power, and like the dissidents
of the Soviet era, spark change through their own brands of thinking.
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The case of Russia is not a hopeless one. However entrenched it may seem, the Putin
regime is very fragile––thus it is manicured and fibbed through the media. Image-making is a
response to lack of substance, and thus fills the empty space where policy should be. There is
room for significant change in Russia, in terms of women’s policy under the banner of the
Kremlin. On the ground level, opposition requires maneuvering through the weeds of
state-crafted political consciousness.
There is a contemporary Russian band that plays secret shows, following a longstanding
affinity for the dissidents’ kitchen concerts, where music icons like Boris Grebenshikov and
Vladimir Vysotsky made their name. The band is called IC3PEAK––pronounced icepick, and
they mobilize, like Pussy Riot, through intense music and art that challenges all social norms,
operating outside of the Putinist sex-appeal landscape. Their shows are mostly attended by
adolescent and young-adult women. Their songs express dismay with the system; they play as
long as they can at underground music venues before local authorities come and break up the
event.182 Their videos are rich with powerful optics183 of Anastasia Kreslina and Nikolay
Kostlylev, eating raw meat by Lenin’s Tomb in Red Square, dominantly sitting on the shoulders
of riot police in front of Lubyanka prison, and pouring kerosene on herself in front of the Russian
White House building. In Smerti bolshe net, (meaning “Death No More”), with 42 million views
on YouTube, Anastasia sings:
I pour kerosene on my eyes.
Let it all burn.
All of Russia is watching me,
Let it all burn.

Andrew Roth, “Even a half-finished show is a Victory,” The Guardian, D
 ecember 12, 2018.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/dec/12/were-not-scared-bands-defy-russian-crackdown-on-political-music
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Kostylev throws a match, and the duo vanishes. Of the video, Kreslina says: “It’s a descriptive
video, we’re not revealing anything new in it. We’re just saying out loud what people would like
to say but are afraid to. We’re describing the state of mind of a person of our generation.”184
Online, millions watch. At venues, both the artists and their fans risk arrest. Regardless of one’s
affinity with the music itself, theirs is a massive display of artistic expression intertwined with
critical thought, something that, as the samizdat and Helsinki Watch era have demonstrated, can
be dismissed only at one’s peril. Everybody, including the Kremlin, listens.

Lucian Kim, “Young Russian Musicians Struggle Under Government Scrunity.” NPR, J anuary 17, 2019.
https://www.npr.org/2019/01/17/685973630/young-russian-musicians-struggle-under-government-scrutiny
184

Goldberg 81

Goldberg 82

Bibliography
“A Man Like Putin,” PBS. Accessed April 20, 2020.
https://www.pbs.org/soundtracks/stories/putin/.
Alexeyeva, Ludmila. Soviet Dissent: Contemporary Movements for National, Religious and
Human Rights. Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1987. Print.
Amos, Howard. “Corps Couture: The Rise of Russia’s Patriotic Fashion Industry,” The Moscow
Times, A
 ugust 15, 2016.
https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2016/08/15/corps-couture-the-rise-of-russias-patriotic
-fashion-industry-a54983
Attwood, Lynne, Lynn Abrams, Cordelia Beattie, Pam Sharpe, and Penny Summerfield. "The
Brezhnev Years." In Gender and Housing in Soviet Russia: Private Life in a Public
Space, 180-99. Manchester University Press, 2010. Accessed January 25, 2020.
www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt155j7bz.14.
Bennetts, Marc. “Alexei Navalny detained at anti-Putin protest in Moscow,” The Guardian,
January 29, 2018.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/28/russian-police-raid-alexi-navalnys-offic
e-on-day-of-anti-putin-rallies
“Bezumno Krasivi, Seria 1,” YouTube, September 1, 2017.
https://www.YouTube.com/watch?v=k1aSZ1kSlso
Boletskaya, Ksenia. Message on Telegram. Accessed April 23, 2020.
https://t.me/ksenyaboletskaya/1138
Bonner, Elena.  Index cards with the names of political prisoners, 1975, Box 15, Folder 34,
Houghton Archive at the Widener Library, Harvard University Archive, Cambridge,
Massachusetts, USA.
Buckley, Mary. Perestroika and Soviet Women. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
Print.
Butler, Judith. "Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology and
Feminist Theory." Theatre Journal vol. 40, no. 4 (1988): 519-31. doi:10.2307/3207893.

Goldberg 83

Campbell, Naomi. “When Naomi Campbell Interviewed Vladimir Putin.” GQ, November 11,
2017. https://www.gq-magazine.co.uk/article/vladimir-putin-interview-naomi-campbell
Connell, R. W., and James W. Messerschmidt. "Hegemonic Masculinity: Rethinking the
Concept." Gender and Society 19, no. 6 (2005): 829-59. Accessed March 30, 2020.
www.jstor.org/stable/27640853.
“Den' materi geroini. Kak v SSSR reshali demograficheskuyu problemu.” Life.ru, J une 9, 2019.
https://life.ru/p/1227735
Dwyer, Colin. “Russia’s Government Resigns As Putin Moves To Change The Constitution.”
NPR, J anuary 15, 2020.
https://www.npr.org/2020/01/15/796583763/russias-government-resigns-as-putin-movesto-change-the-constitution
Forbes, “2017 Power Women: Most Powerful Women in Media and Entertainment.” Accessed
April 19, 2020.
https://www.forbes.com/pictures/59f3a0e84bbe6f37dda13e8e/no-5-margarita-simonyan/#
2caeb51064ba
Gorbunova, Yulia. “I Could Kill You and No One Would Stop Me: Weak State Response to
Domestic Violence in Russia.” New York: Human Rights Watch, 2018. Accessed
January 23, 2020.
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/russia1018_web3.pdf
Greene, Sam & Robertson, Graeme. Putin v. The People. New Haven: Yale University Press,
2019. Print.
Haworth, Abigail. “Lessons in Love: The Millionaire Hunters.” MarieClaire, M
 arch 31, 2008.
https://www.marieclaire.com/politics/news/a1324/geisha-school-russia/
Holmgren, Beth. "Toward an Understanding of Gendered Agency in Contemporary Russia."
Signs 38, no. 3 (2013): 535-42. Accessed March 5, 2020. doi:10.1086/668517
Inter-Parliamentary Union, “Russian Federation State Duma.” Accessed January 12, 2020.
http://archive.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2263_11.htm

Goldberg 84

Ioffe, Julia. “What is Russia Today? The Kremlin’s propaganda outlet has an identity crisis.”
Columbia Journalism Review, S
 eptember/October 2010.
https://archives.cjr.org/feature/what_is_russia_today.php?page=all&print=true
Ioffe, Julia. “Surreal Politik.” Foreign Policy, A
 ugust 11, 2011.
https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/08/11/surreal-politik/
Jack, Andrew. Inside Putin’s Russia. N
 ew York: Oxford University Press, 2004. Print.
Johnson, Janet Elise. "Privatizing Pain: The Problem of Woman Battery in Russia." NWSA
Journal 13, no. 3 (2001): 153-68. Accessed March 5, 2020.
www.jstor.org/stable/4316848.
Johnson, Janet Elise & Saarinen, Aino. “Twenty-First-Century Feminisms under Repression:
Gender Regime Change and the Women’s Crisis Center Movement in Russia,” S
 igns,
Vol. 38, No. 3. (Spring 2013): pp. 543-567
Kandiyoti, Deniz. "Bargaining with Patriarchy." Gender and Society 2, no. 3 (1988): 274-90.
Accessed April 22, 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/190357.
Kapoor, Nivedeta. “Women in the Duma: Why Post-Soviet Russia Has Low Female
Representation.” Comparative Politics, vol. 23 no 2. 2016. 59-72.
Kim, Lucian. “Young Russian Musciains Struggle Under Government Scrutiny.” NPR, J anuary
17, 2019.
https://www.npr.org/2019/01/17/685973630/young-russian-musicians-struggle-under-gov
ernment-scrutiny
Kizenko, Nadieszda. "Feminized Patriarchy? Orthodoxy and Gender in Post-Soviet Russia."
Signs 38, no. 3 (2013): 595-621. Accessed April 22, 2020. doi:10.1086/668516.
Kolchevska, Natasha. "Angels in the Home and at Work: Russian Women in the Khrushchev
Years." Women's Studies Quarterly 33, no. 3/4 (2005): 114-37. Accessed January 25,
2020. www.jstor.org/stable/40004421.
Kosmodemyanskaya, Lyubov Timofeeva. Povest o Zoe u Shure. L
 ib.ru, accessed April 27, 2020.
http://lib.ru/PRIKL/PIONERY/zoyshura.txt

Goldberg 85

Kozma, Alyson, and Sheila Dauer. "Domestic Violence as Torture: Integrating a Human Rights
Framework into The Domestic Violence Movement." Off Our Backs 31, no. 11 (2001):
28-30. Accessed March 5, 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/20837481.
Kuehnast, Kathleen, and Carol Nechemias. Post Soviet Women Encountering Transition: Nation
Building, Economic Survival, and Civic Activism. W
 oodrow Wilson Press with Johns
Hopkins University Press, 2004. Print.
Lacquer, Walter. Putinism: Russia and Its Future with the West. New York: Thomas Dunne
Books, 2015. Print.
Lapidus, Gail Warshovsky. Women in Russia. S
 an Francisco: Stanford University Press, 1977.
Print.
“Leading Russian Paper Vedemosti’s New Editor Bans Criticism.” The Moscow Times, April 23,
2020.
https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2020/04/23/leading-russian-paper-vedomostis-new-ed
itor-bans-putin-criticism-a70075
Levada Center. “Indicators.” Accessed April 23, 2020. https://www.levada.ru/en/ratings/
Lindgren, James. “Defining Pornography.” University of Pennsylvania Law Review, vol. 141, no.
4. (1993): 1153-1275.
Mirkin, Harris. "The Passive Female the Theory of Patriarchy." American Studies 25, no. 2
(1984): 39-57. Accessed April 22, 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/40641862.
Mostovshikov, Egor. “Yelena Mizulina: the creation of a conservative.” Open Democracy, M
 ay
28, 2015.
https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/yelena-mizulina-creation-of-conservative/
Navalny, Alexei. “Krimski Most. Ykradeno s lyobvyo!” YouTube, March 24, 2020.
https://www.YouTube.com/watch?v=0LAdAV-jHhw
Nemtsova, Anna. “The Russian Sleazeball Peddling Girls to Billionaires,” The Daily Beast, July
29, 2019.
https://www.thedailybeast.com/peter-listerman-the-sleazeball-peddling-russian-girls-to-bi
llionaires

Goldberg 86

Nikerichev, Alexei. “Coronavirus in Russia: The Latest News.” The Moscow Times, A
 pril 27,
2020.
https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2020/04/27/coronavirus-in-russia-the-latest-news-apri
l-27-a69117
Pilkington, Hillary. Gender, Generation and Identity in Contemporary Russia. L
 ondon:
Routledge Press, 1996. Google Books.
“Poderzhite polygodovoe obnylenye nalogov dlya malogo i srednego biznesa,” Change.org.
March 24, 2020. https://tinyurl.com/ycwysqyp
Pomerantsev, Peter. Nothing is True and Everything is Possible: The Surreal Heart of the New
Russia. N
 ew York: PublicAffairs, 2015. Print.
Popkova, Lyudmilla. “Women’s Political Activism in Russia: The Case of Samara.” in
Post-Soviet Women Encountering Transition, e dited by Kathleen Kuenahst and Carol
Nahemias, 172-194. Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2004. Print.
Posadskaya, Anastasia. Women in Russia: A New Era in Russian Feminism. N
 ew York: Verso
Press. 1994. Print.
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. “One-Fifth of Russians Live in Poverty, 36 Percent in ‘Risk
Zone,’ Study Finds,” RFERL, November 21, 2018.
https://www.rferl.org/a/study-22-percent-of-russians-live-in-poverty-36-percent-in-risk-z
one-/29613059.html
Rancour-Laferriere, Daniel. "Is the Slave Soul of Russia a Gendered Object?" In The Slave Soul
of Russia: Moral Masochism and the Cult of Suffering, 134-80. New York; London:
NYU Press, 1995. Accessed March 5, 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt9qg1cj.10.
Reuters, “Happy Birthday Mr. Putin! Russian college co-eds pose for sexy lingerie calendar for
PM’s birthday,” NY Daily News, O
 ctober 7, 2010.
https://www.nydailynews.com/life-style/happy-birthday-mr-putin-russian-college-co-edspose-sexy-lingerie-calendar-pm-birthday-article-1.191352
Rivkin-Fish, Michele. "Conceptualizing Feminist Strategies for Russian Reproductive Politics:
Abortion, Surrogate Motherhood, and Family Support after Socialism." Signs 38, no. 3
(2013): 569-93. Accessed March 7, 2020. doi:10.1086/668606.

Goldberg 87

Roache, Madeline. “Where’s Putin? Russia’s President Stays Out of Sight as Coronavirus Hits
Economy.” Time, A
 pril 24, 2020.
https://time.com/5827078/russia-putin-coronavirus-economy/
Roth, Andrew. “Even a half-finished show is a victory: Russian bands fight new crackdown.”
The Guardian, D
 ecember 12, 2018.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/dec/12/were-not-scared-bands-defy-russian-cra
ckdown-on-political-music
Salganik, Miriam. "Emancipated Cinderellas: Women in Russia." India International Centre
Quarterly 21, no. 2/3 (1994): 113-30. Accessed March 5, 2020.
www.jstor.org/stable/23003640.
Sherman, Justin. “Russia’s ‘Data Localization’ Efforts May Guide Other Governments.” Defense
One, January 13, 2020.
https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2020/01/russias-data-localization-push-may-guide-oth
er-governments/162380/
Sherman, Justin. “Russia’s Domestic Internet Is a Threat to the Global Internet.” October 24,
2019.
https://slate.com/technology/2019/10/russia-runet-disconnection-domestic-internet.html
Sobchak, Ksenia and Oksana Robski, “Zamuzh za millionera, ili brack vishevo sorta,”
Book-online, Accessed April 22, 2020. http://book-online.com.ua/read.php?book=4620
Sperling, Valerie. Organizing Women in Contemporary Russia: Engendering Transition.
London: Cambridge University Press, 1999. Print.
Sperling, Valerie. Sex, Politics, and Putin. N
 ew York: Oxford University Press, 2014. Print.
Stryker, Rachel. "Empowering Women in Russia: Activism, Aid, and NGOs." Anthropological
Quarterly 80, no. 1 (2007): 259-63. Accessed March 5, 2020.
www.jstor.org/stable/4150951.
“Thanks, but we’ll keep ‘mother’ & ‘father’: Putin rejects politically correct ‘parent #1 & #2’
titles.” Russia Today, N
 ovember 30, 2019.
https://www.rt.com/russia/474708-putin-mother-father-parent/

Goldberg 88

Trochev, Alexei. "Less Democracy, More Courts: A Puzzle of Judicial Review in Russia." Law
& Society Review 38, no. 3 (2004): 513-48. Accessed March 5, 2020.
www.jstor.org/stable/1555143.
Troianovski, Anton. “Branding Putin: How the Kremlin turned the Russian President into a
Global Icon,” Washington Post, J uly 12, 2018.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2018/world/putin-brand/
Turbine, Vikki. "Locating Women's Human Rights in Post-Soviet Provincial Russia."
Europe-Asia Studies 64, no. 10 (2012): 1847-869. Accessed March 5, 2020.
www.jstor.org/stable/23275000.
Voice of America, “Pro-Kremlin Youth Group Creatively Promotes ‘Patriotic’ Propaganda,”
YouTube, January 25, 2015. https://www.YouTube.com/watch?v=MABie5BU7yA
Voronina, Olga. "Soviet Patriarchy: Past and Present." Hypatia 8, no. 4 (1993): 97-112.
Accessed April 22, 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/3810373.
Wamsley, Laurel. “Putin Approves Law Labeling Journalists ‘Foreign Agents’ in Russia,” NPR,
December 2, 2019.
https://www.npr.org/2019/12/02/784220222/putin-approves-law-labeling-journalists-fore
ign-agents-in-russia
Ward, Christopher J. "Working Alone: Women on the Railway." In Brezhnev's Folly: The
Building of BAM and Late Soviet Socialism, 69-97. Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of
Pittsburgh Press, 2009. Accessed January 25, 2020. doi:10.2307/j.ctt6wrdkj.10.
YouTube, “Krasotka gadaet na pervi raz,” February 20, 2012.
https://www.YouTube.com/watch?v=Noo0lzJILaM
YouTube, “Moscow. Anti-beer. Medvedev Girls vs. Putin Army 2” August 6, 2011.
https://www.YouTube.com/watch?v=zTGOlFmJ6zY
Zakirova, Venera. "Gender Inequality in Russia: The Perspective of Participatory Gender
Budgeting." Reproductive Health Matters2 2, no. 44 (2014): 202-12. Accessed March 5,
2020. www.jstor.org/stable/43288380.
Zhohova, Anastasia. “Smena Orientatsii: zachem telekanal ‘U’ stal iklychitelno zhenskim,”
Forbes Russia, January 16, 2013.

Goldberg 89

https://www.forbes.ru/kompanii/internet-telekom-i-media/249682-smena-orientatsii-zach
em-telekanal-yu-stal-isklyuchitelno-z
Zhurzhenko, Tatiana. “Capitalism, autocracy and political masculinities in Russia,” Eurozine,
May 18, 2016.
https://www.eurozine.com/capitalism-autocracy-and-political-masculinities-in-russia/#fo
otnote-2
“Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya, 1923-1941.” Encyclopedia. Last updated April 8, 2020.
https://www.encyclopedia.com/women/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/ko
smodemyanskaya-zoya-1923-1941

